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MEAN-FIELD GAMES OF FINITE-FUEL CAPACITY EXPANSION
WITH SINGULAR CONTROLS
LUCIANO CAMPI, TIZIANO DE ANGELIS, MADDALENA GHIO, AND GIULIA LIVIERI
Abstract. We study Nash equilibria for a sequence of symmetric N-player stochastic
games of finite-fuel capacity expansion with singular controls and their mean-field
game (MFG) counterpart. We construct a solution of the MFG via a simple iterative
scheme that produces an optimal control in terms of a Skorokhod reflection at a
(state-dependent) surface that splits the state space in action and inaction region.
We then show that a solution of the MFG of capacity expansion induces approximate
Nash equilibria for the N-player games with approximation error ε going to zero as
N tends to infinity. Our analysis relies entirely on probabilistic methods and extends
the well-known connection between singular stochastic control and optimal stopping
to a mean-field framework.
1. Introduction
Mean field games (MFGs) were first introduced in Huang et al. (2006) and Lasry and
Lions (2007) as an elegant and tractable way to study approximate Nash equilibria in
nonzero-sum symmetric stochastic differential games for a large population of players
with a mean-field interaction, i.e., each player interacts with the rest of the population
through its empirical distribution. Exploiting the underlying symmetry while passing
to the limit with the number of players tending to infinity, the sequence of games
converges in some sense to an optimisation problem for a ‘representative player’. Such
representative player responds optimally to the distribution of the population which, at
equilibrium, coincides with the distribution of the optimally controlled state variable.
Once the limit problem is solved, its solution can typically be implemented in the N -
player game and provides an approximate Nash equilibrium with vanishing error as
N →∞.
From a practical point of view this approximation result can be very useful since
tackling directly the N -player game is often unfeasible when N is very large due the
curse of dimensionality. In the past few years many authors from different mathematical
backgrounds have studied this class of games. Two approaches have been adopted to
tackle the study of MFGs: an analytic approach as in, e.g., the initial paper Lasry
and Lions (2007), and a probabilistic one. Here we follow the latter, which has been
developed in a series of papers by Carmona, Delarue, and their co-authors (see, e.g.,
Carmona and Delarue (2013); Carmona et al. (2013, 2015, 2016)). We refer the reader
to the lecture notes by Cardaliaguet (2012) and the two-volume monograph by Carmona
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et al. (2018) for comprehensive presentations of MFG theory and its applications from
analytic and probabilistic perspective, respectively.
The literature on MFGs is rapidly growing. Most of the papers deal with games where
players use ‘regular controls’ in order to optimise their payoffs. Here by regular controls
we mean those having a bounded impact on the velocity of the underlying dynamics.
Only few papers have studied the case of MFGs with singular controls, which is a larger
class of controls allowing for unbounded changes in the velocity of the underlying process
and possible discontinuities in the state trajectories. More specifically, Fu and Horst
(2017) established an abstract existence result for solutions of a general MFG with
singular control, using the notion of relaxed solutions. The same approach was also
applied in Fu (2019) to extend the previous results to MFG with interaction through
the controls as well. In both papers, the issue of finding approximate Nash equilibria
in the N -player games is left aside. To the best of our knowledge, only the works of
Cao et al. (2017) and of Guo and Xu (2019) tackle simultaneously MFGs and N -player
games with singular controls. Their analysis is based on verification theorems and quasi-
variational inequalities specifically designed for their settings and not amenable to simple
extensions. For completeness, we also mention the two papers Hu et al. (2014), Zhang
(2012), which use a maximum principle approach to solve singular control problems
with mean-field dynamics for the state variables. A class of controls closely related to
singular controls is that of impulses, which has also received attention recently within
MFG theory. We mention the two papers Basei et al. (2019) and Zhou and Huang
(2017), where MFGs with impulse controls are considered and solved using an approach
based on quasi-variational inequalities and exploiting the stationarity properties of their
settings. Finally, the article Bertucci (2020) provides a variational characterization of
the density of jumping particles coming from an impulse control problem.
1.1. Model description. In this article, we study Nash equilibria for a class of sym-
metric N -player stochastic differential games, for large N , and we characterize the
solutions of the associated MFG. Specifically, we consider a class of finite-fuel capacity
expansion games with singular controls.
In order to set out our main results, we provide here a short description of the N -
player game of capacity expansion (see Section 4.1 for a full account). The game is set
over a finite-time horizon T given and fixed. We consider a complete probability space
(Ω,F ,P) equipped with a right-continuous filtration F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] which is augmented
with all the P-null sets. There areN players in the game and the i-th player i = 1, . . . , N
chooses a strategy ξN,i = (ξN,it )t∈[0,T ] from the set of all right-continuous non-decreasing
adapted processes, affecting their own private state variables (XN,i, Y N,i). Given a drift
a : R× [0, 1]→ R and a volatility σ : R→ R+, the private states have dynamics
XN,it = X
i
0 +
∫ t
0
a(XN,is ,m
N
s ) ds+
∫ t
0
σ(XN,is ) dW
i
s ,
Y N,it = Y
i
0− + ξ
N,i
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
(1.1)
where (W 1, . . . ,WN ) is a N -dimensional Brownian motion. The initial conditions
(Xi0, Y
i
0−) are i.i.d. random variables with common distribution ν ∈ P(Σ), where P(Σ)
is the space of all probability measures on Σ := R× [0, 1]. The players interact through
the mean-field term mNt appearing in the drift and given by
mNt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y N,it =
∫
Σ
y µNt (dx,dy), t ∈ [0, T ],
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where µNt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δ(XN,it ,Y
N,i
t )
denotes the empirical probability measure of the play-
ers’ states with δz the Dirac delta mass at z ∈ Σ. In (1.1), each ξN,i represents the
investment in additional capacity made by the i-th player. Each player aims at maxi-
mizing an expected payoff of the form
(1.2) JN,i := E
[∫ T
0
e−rtf(XN,it , Y
N,i
t ) dt−
∫
[0,T ]
e−rt c0 dξ
N,i
t
]
,
for a fixed discount rate r > 0, some cost c0 > 0 and some running payoff f (the
same for all players). The optimisation is subject to the so-called finite-fuel constraint :
Y0−+ ξ
N,i
t ∈ [0, 1] for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all i = 1, . . . , N . We are interested in computing
(approximate) Nash equilibria of this N -player game via the MFG approach. This
requires to pass to the limit as N → ∞ and to identify the limiting MFG. The latter
must be solved (as explicitly as possible) and the associated optimal control is then
implemented in theN -player game for sufficiently large N , as a proxy for the equilibrium
strategy.
Singular control problems with finite (and infinite) fuel find numerous applications
in the economic literature and originated from the engineering literature in the late
60’s (see Bather and Chernoff (1967) for a seminal paper and, for example, Benesˇ et al.
(1980); Karatzas (1985); El Karoui and Karatzas (1988) for early contributions to the
finite fuel case). Game versions of these problems are a natural extension of the single
agent set-up and allow to model numerous applied situations. Here in particular we
make assumptions on the structure of the interaction across players that are suitable
to model the so-called goodwill problem (see, e.g., Marinelli (2007); Jack et al. (2008)
in a stochastic environment and Buratto and Viscolani (2002) in a deterministic one).
Specifically, players can be interpreted as firms that produce the same good (e.g., mobile
phones) and must decide how to advertise it over a finite time horizon. The i-th firm’s
product has a market price that depends on the particular type/brand (e.g., Apple,
Huawei, etc.) and we model that by the processXN,i. Each firm can invest in marketing
strategies in order to raise the profile of their product and its popularity. The i-th
firm’s cumulative amount of investment that goes towards advertising is modelled by
the process Y N,i, where the finite-fuel feature naturally incorporates the idea that firms
set a maximum budget for advertising over the period [0, T ]. All firms measure their
performance in terms of future discounted revenues: they use a running profit function
(x, y) 7→ f(x, y) and deduct the (proportional) cost of advertising c0dξ. A typical
example is f(x, y) = x ·yα, α ∈ (0, 1), where profits are linear in the product’s price and
increasing and concave as function of the total investment made towards advertising.
From the point of view of the i-th firm, investing ∆ξN,i > 0 has a cost c0∆ξ
N,i and
produces two effects. First of all it increases the popularity of the i-th firm’s product,
hence increasing the running profit to the level f(x, y+∆ξN,i) (we are tacitly assuming
y 7→ f(x, y) increasing). Secondly, it has a broader impact on the visibility of the type
of product (e.g., mobile phones) and will stimulate the public’s demand for that good.
This has a knock-on effect on the trend of the prices of all the firms that produce the
same good. We model this fact via the interaction term mNt in the price dynamics and
we will assume that the drift function increases with the average spending in advertising
across all companies, i.e., m 7→ a(x,m) is non-decreasing.
1.2. Our contribution and methodology. We focus on the construction of approx-
imate Nash equilibria for the N -player game through solutions of the corresponding
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MFG. First, we formulate the MFG of capacity expansion, i.e., the limit model cor-
responding to the above N -player games as N → ∞ (Section 2). Then, under mild
assumptions on the problem’s data we construct a solution in feedback form of the
MFG of capacity expansion (Section 3). Our constructive approach, based on an intu-
itive iterative scheme, allows us to determine the optimal control in the MFG in terms of
an optimal boundary (t, x) 7→ c(t, x) that splits the state space [0, T ]×R× [0, 1] into an
action region and an inaction region; see Theorem 2.4 in Section 2. The optimal strat-
egy prescribes to keep the controlled dynamics underlying the MFG inside the closure
of the inaction region by Skorokhod reflection. Finally, whenever the optimal boundary
in the MFG is Lipschitz continuous in its second variable we can show that it induces
a sequence of approximate εN -Nash equilibria for the N -player games with vanishing
approximation error at rate O(1/
√
N) as N tends to infinity; see Theorem 4.2 in Section
2. While Lipschitz regularity of optimal boundaries is in general a delicate issue, we
provide sufficient conditions on our problem data that guarantee such regularity. Since
our conditions are far from being necessary, in Section 4.4 we also illustrate an example
with a clear economic interpretation which violates those conditions and yet yields a
Lipschitz boundary.
The proof of Theorem 2.4 on the existence of a feedback solution for the limit MFG
hinges on a well-known connection between singular stochastic control and optimal
stopping (e.g., Baldursson and Karatzas (1996); Karatzas and Shreve (1984, 1985)),
which we apply in the analysis of our iterative scheme. This approach allows us to
overcome the usual difficulties arising from fixed-point arguments often employed in the
literature on MFGs. Moreover, as a byproduct we also obtain that a connection between
singular control problems of capacity expansion and problems of optimal stopping holds
in the setting of our MFG. The finite-fuel condition is not a structural condition and it
is clear that our choice of y ∈ [0, 1] is not restrictive: indeed, we could equally consider
y ∈ [0, y¯] for any y¯ > 0 (see Remark 2.1). This is suggestive that our results may be
extended to the infinite-fuel setting by considering sequences of problems with increasing
fuel and limiting arguments. However, since this extension is non-trivial, we leave it for
later work and here focus on the finite-fuel case.
1.3. Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we formulate the MFG of capac-
ity expansion, we state the standing assumptions on the coefficients in the underlying
dynamics and on the profit function, and we state the existence result for the MFG
(Theorem 2.4). In Section 3 we prove Theorem 2.4 by constructing a solutions of the
MFG in feedback form via an iterative scheme. In particular, we characterise the op-
timal control in terms of the solution to a Skorokhod reflection problem at an optimal
boundary (surface) that splits the state space [0, T ]×Σ into action and inaction regions.
Finally, in Section 4 we formally introduce the symmetric N -player game of capacity
expansion and we show that the solution of the MFG found in Section 3 induces approx-
imate Nash equilibria for the N -player games, with vanishing error of order O(1/
√
N)
as N →∞.
1.4. Frequently used notations. We conclude the Introduction with a summary of
notations that will be used throughout the paper.
Let Σ := R × [0, 1] and let P(Σ) denote the set of all probability measures on Σ
equipped with the Borel σ-field B(Σ). Let P2(Σ) be the subset of P(Σ) of probability
measures with finite second moment. The set Σ and the N -fold product space ΣN are
the state spaces for the controlled processes (X,Y ) and (XN , Y N ) that are underlying
MEAN-FIELD GAMES OF SINGULAR CONTROL WITH FINITE FUEL 5
the MFG and the N -player game, respectively. Since our problems are set on a finite-
time horizon, we also consider ‘time’ as a state variable and will use the state space
[0, T ]× Σ. Given a set A ⊂ [0, T ]× Σ we denote its closure by A.
Given a filtered probability space Π := (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t≥0,P) satisfying the usual
conditions and a F0-measurable random variable Z ∈ [0, 1], we denote
ΞΠ(Z) :=
{
ξ : (ξt)t≥0 is F-adapted, non-decreasing, right-continuous,
with ξ0− = 0 and Z + ξt ∈ [0, 1] for all t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.
}
.
The set ΞΠ(Z) will be the set of admissible strategies for the players in our games. The
random variable Z will be replaced by the initial value of the process Y (for the MFG)
or Y N,i (for the i-th player in the N -player game). Often we will drop the dependence
of Ξ on the probability space Π and the random variable Z, as no confusion shall arise.
Finally, the parameters c0 > 0 and r ≥ 0 are fixed throughout and describe the cost
of exerting control and the discount factor, respectively.
2. The mean-field game: setting and main results
In this section we set-up the mean-field game associated with the N -player game
described above and we state the main result concerning the existence and structure of
the optimal control for this game; see Theorem 2.4. Later, in Section 4 we will link the
MFG to the N -player game. Below we use the notation introduced in Section 1.4.
2.1. The mean-field game. Let Π = (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability
space satisfying the usual conditions and supporting a one-dimensional F-Brownian
motion W . Notice that the initial σ-field F0 is not necessarily trivial.
Let (X0, Y0−) be a two-dimensional F0-measurable random variable with joint law
ν ∈ P(Σ) and let ξ ∈ ΞΠ(Y0−) be an admissible strategy. Then, given a bounded Borel
measurable function m : [0, T ] → [0, 1], for all t ∈ [0, T ] we define the 2-dimensional,
degenerate, controlled dynamics
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
a(Xs,m(s)) ds +
∫ t
0
σ(Xs)dWs,
Y ξt = Y0− + ξt.
(2.1)
The goal of the “representative player” consists of maximizing over the set of all admis-
sible strategies ξ ∈ ΞΠ(Y0−) the following objective functional
(2.2) J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
e−rtf(Xt, Y
ξ
t )dt−
∫
[0,T ]
e−rtc0dξt
]
,
where f is some running payoff function and we recall that c0 > 0 is some cost and
r ≥ 0. Assumptions on all the coefficients appearing in the state variables’ dynamics
and in the objective functional will be given below. The integral with respect to the
positive random measure dξ includes possible atoms at the initial and terminal time
(corresponding to possible jumps of ξ).
Remark 2.1. The choice Y ∈ [0, 1] in the definition of the set Ξ of admissible strategies
is with no loss of generality and we could equally consider Y ∈ [0, y¯] for y¯ > 0. The
assumption of finite fuel is consistent with real-world applications, where a firm would
set aside a certain budget to be spent over a given period [0, T ].
6 L. CAMPI, T. DE ANGELIS, M. GHIO, G. LIVIERI
Since we are interested in the MFG that arises from the N -player game (1.1)-(1.2),
in the limit as N →∞, it is natural to seek for an admissible optimal strategy ξ (given
m) such that the following consistency condition holds
m(t) = E[Y ξt ], t ∈ [0, T ].(2.3)
The precise definition of MFG solution will be given in Definition 2.2 below. In order to
develop our methodology, it is convenient to state a version of the MFG starting from
any time t ∈ [0, T ] and any realization (x, y) ∈ Σ of the states (Xt, Yt−). Therefore, let
us consider the dynamics (2.1) conditional on the initial data (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ, i.e.,
Xt,xt+s = x+
∫ s
0
a(Xt,xt+u,m(t+ u)) du+
∫ s
0
σ(Xt,xt+u)dWt+u,
Y t,x,y; ξt+s = y + (ξt+s − ξt−), s ∈ [0, T − t],
(2.4)
where dWt+u = d(Wt+u −Wt). Since the increments of the control ξ ∈ ΞΠ(Y0−), after
time t, may in general depend on (t, x, y), we account for that dependence by denoting
Y t,x,y; ξ (and ξt,x,y if necessary). Instead, given a bounded measurable function m, the
dynamics of X only depends on the initial condition Xt = x, which motivates the use of
the notation Xt,x. For the original case of the process started at time zero (i.e., t = 0),
we use the simpler notation (Xxs , Y
x,y; ξ
s )s∈[0,T ].
The notation introduced above is somewhat cumbersome and we will often use
Pt,x,y( · ) = P( · |Xt = x, Yt− = y) for simplicity. So for any bounded measurable function
g and any stopping time τ ∈ [0, T − t] we have
E
[
g(t+ τ,Xt,xt+τ , Y
t,x,y; ξ
t+τ )
]
= Et,x,y
[
g(t+ τ,Xt+τ , Y
ξ
t+τ )
]
,
and, moreover, we use Px,y = P0,x,y for the special case t = 0.
It is clear that given ξ ∈ ΞΠ(Y0−) the process ξˆs := ξt+s − ξt− is right continuous,
non-decreasing and adapted with ξˆ0− = 0. Moreover, y + ξˆ ∈ [0, 1], Pt,x,y a.s. (i.e.,
conditionally on (Xt, Y
ξ
t−) = (x, y)) because ξ ∈ ΞΠ(Y0−). Then, it is useful to introduce
the set
ΞΠt,x(y) :=
{
ξ : (ξs)s≥0 is (Ft+s)s≥0-adapted, non-decreasing, right-continuous,
with ξ0− = 0 and y + ξs ∈ [0, 1] for all s ∈ [0, T − t], Pt,x,y-a.s.
}
.
Clearly ΞΠ0,x(y) = Ξ
Π(y). Here Π is fixed, so we can drop the superscript in the definition
of the set of admissible controls. We will sometimes drop also the subscript x and just
write Ξt(y) = Ξt,x(y). Furthermore, when no confusion shall arise we write ξ ∈ Ξt(y)
although we refer to ξˆ ∈ Ξt(y) with ξˆs = ξt+s − ξt−.
Assuming that the mapping (x, y) 7→ Ex,y[Y ξt ] is measurable for any admissible ξ, we
can express the consistency condition (2.3) as
m(t) =
∫
Σ
Ex,y[Y
ξ
t ]ν(dx,dy) =
∫
Σ
∫
Σ
y′µx,y; ξt (dx
′,dy′)ν(dx,dy),
where µx,y; ξt := L(Xxt , Y x,y; ξt ) ∈ P(Σ) is the law of the pair (Xxt , Y x,y; ξt ) and the integral
with respect to ν(dx,dy) accounts for the fact that (X0, Y0−)
d∼ ν.
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Turning our attention to the optimisation problem, we have that the maximal ex-
pected payoff associated with a condition (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ is given by
v(t, x, y) := sup
ξ∈Ξt,x(y)
J(t, x, y; ξ) with
J(t, x, y; ξ) := Et,x,y
[∫ T−t
0
e−rsf(Xt+s, Y
ξ
t+s) ds−
∫
[0,T−t]
e−rsc0dξs
]
.
(2.5)
The initial objective function in (2.2) and the optimisation problem in (2.5) are easily
linked by averaging the latter over the initial condition (X0, Y0−)
d∼ ν ∈ P(Σ). That is
V ν := sup
ξ∈Ξ
J(ξ) with J(ξ) :=
∫
Σ
J(0, x, y; ξ)ν(dx,dy),
where we write Ξ = Ξ(Y0−) for simplicity.
Now we define solutions of the MFG of capacity expansion.
Definition 2.2 (Solution of the MFG of capacity expansion). A solution of the MFG of
capacity expansion with initial condition ν ∈ P2(Σ) is a pair (m∗, ξ∗) with m∗ : [0, T ]→
[0, 1] a measurable function and ξ∗ ∈ Ξ such that:
(i) (Optimality property). ξ∗ is optimal, i.e.,
J(ξ∗) = V ν = sup
ξ∈Ξ
E
[∫ T
0
e−rtf(X∗t , Y
ξ
t )dt−
∫
[0,T ]
e−rtc0dξt
]
,
where (X∗, Y ξ) is a solution of Eq. (2.1) associated to (m∗, ξ).
(ii) (Mean-field property). Letting (X∗, Y ∗) be the solution of Eq.(2.1) associated to
(m∗, ξ∗), the consistency condition holds, i.e.,
m∗(t) =
∫
Σ
Ex,y[Y
∗
t ]ν(dx,dy),
for each t ∈ [0, T ].
We will say that a solution ξ∗ of the MFG is in feedback form if we have ξ∗t =
η(t,X, Y0−), t ∈ [0, T ], for some non-anticipative mapping
η : [0, T ] ×C([0, T ];R) × [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
(i.e., such that η(t,X, Y0−) = η(t, (Xs∧t)s∈[0,T ], Y0−)).
We observe that the definition of MFG solution above mimics the structure of a Nash
equilibrium (NE) in classical game theory. Indeed, for a NE we first need to compute
the best response of each player while keeping the strategies of her competitors fixed,
and then we obtain the equilibrium as a fixed point of the best response map. Likewise,
the optimality condition (i) corresponds to computing the best response against a given
behaviour of the population described by m∗; condition (ii) is a fixed point condition,
stating thatm∗ has to be consistent with the best response of the ‘representative player’.
2.2. Assumptions and main result. Before stating our main result regarding the
existence and structure of the solution to the MFG, we list below the assumptions
needed in our approach.
Assumption 1 (Coefficients of the SDE). For the functions a : Σ→ R and σ : R→ R+
the following hold:
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(i) a and σ are Lipschitz continuous with constant L > 0, i.e., for all x, x′ ∈ R and
m,m′ ∈ [0, 1], we have∣∣a(x,m) − a(x′,m′)∣∣+ ∣∣σ(x)− σ(x′)∣∣ ≤ L(∣∣x− x′∣∣+ ∣∣m−m′∣∣).
(ii) The mapping m 7→ a(x,m) is non-decreasing on [0, 1] for all x ∈ R.
Part (i) of the assumption guarantees that given any Borel measurable function m :
[0, T ] → [0, 1] the first equation in (2.4) admits a unique strong solution (see, e.g.,
Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Theorem 5.2.9). Moreover, by a well-known application of
Kolmogorov-Chentsov’s continuity theorem, there exists a modification X˜ of X which
is continuous as a random field, i.e., (t, x, s) 7→ X˜t,xt+s is continuous P-a.s. (see, e.g.,
Karatzas and Shreve (1998), pp. 397-398, or Baldi (2017), Theorem 9.9). From now on
we tacitly assume that we always work with such modification and we denote it again
by X.
Part (i) of the assumption could be relaxed but at the cost of additional technicalities
in the proofs. In principle we only need sufficient regularity on the coefficients to
guarantee existence of a unique strong solution for X which is also continuous with
respect to its initial datum (t, x). Part (ii) instead is instrumental in our construction
of the optimal control in the MFG and will be used later for a comparison result (Lemma
3.1). Notice that (ii) is well-suited for the application to the goodwill problem described
in Section 1.1 in the Introduction. Typical examples that we have in mind for the drift
are a(x,m) = (m − x) (mean-reverting), a(x,m) = mx (geometric Brownian motion)
and a(x,m) = m (arithmetic Brownian motion).
Next we give assumptions on the running profit appearing in the optimisation prob-
lem.
Assumption 2 (Profit function). The running profit f : Σ→ [0,∞) is continuous and
the partial derivatives ∂yf and ∂xyf exist and are continuous on R×(0, 1). Furthermore,
we have
(i) Monotonicity: x 7→ f(x, y), y 7→ f(x, y) and x 7→ ∂yf(x, y) are increasing, with
(2.6) lim
x→−∞
∂yf(x, y) < rc0 < lim
x→+∞
∂yf(x, y);
(ii) Concavity: y 7→ f(x, y) is strictly concave for all x ∈ R.
(iii) The mixed derivative is strictly positive, i.e., ∂xyf > 0 on R× (0, 1).
The set of assumptions above is in line with the literature on irreversible investment
and is fulfilled for example by profit functions of Cobb-Douglas type (i.e., f(x, y) = xαyβ
with α ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ (0, 1) and x > 0).
We conclude with some standard integrability conditions that guarantee that the
problem is well-posed and will allow us to use dominated convergence theorem in some
of the technical steps in the proofs.
Assumption 3 (Integrability). There exists p > 1 such that, given any Borel measur-
able m : [0, T ] → [0, 1] and letting X be the associated solution of the SDE (2.4), we
have
Et,x,y
[∫ T−t
0
e−rs
(
|f(Xt+s, y)|p + |∂yf(Xt+s, y)|p
)
ds
]
<∞,
for all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × R× [0, 1]. Finally, ν ∈ P2(Σ).
Remark 2.3 (State space). For specific applications it may be convenient to restrict
the state space of the process X to the positive half-line [0,∞) or to a generic (possibly
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unbounded) interval (x, x). In those cases the assumptions above and the further ones we
will make in the next sections can be adapted in a straightforward manner. In particular
the limits in (2.6) are amended by letting x tend to the endpoints of the relevant domain.
If the end-points of the domain are inaccessible to the process X all our arguments of
proof continue to hold up to trivial changes in the notation. For a more general boundary
behaviour of the process some tweaks may be needed on a case by cases basis.
We are now ready to state the main results concerning the MFG described above.
The proof requires a number of technical steps and hinges on a iterative method whose
details are provided in Section 3.
Theorem 2.4 (Solution of the MFG of capacity expansion). Suppose Assumptions 1,
2 and 3 hold. Then, there exists a upper-semi continuous function c : [0, T ]×R→ [0, 1],
with t 7→ c(t, x) and x 7→ c(t, x) both non-decreasing, such that the pair (m∗, ξ∗) with
ξ∗t := sup
0≤s≤t
(c(s,X∗s )− Y0−)+, m∗(t) :=
∫
Σ
Ex,y [Y
∗
t ] ν(dx,dy), t ∈ [0, T ],
is a solution of the MFG as in Definition 2.2.
Differently from the vast majority of papers that analyse MFGs here we are able not
only to prove existence of a solution but also to characterise the optimal control in terms
of a upper semi-continuous, monotone surface in the state space [0, T ] × Σ. Moreover,
the iterative scheme that we devise for the proof of the theorem suggests a procedure
to actually construct the optimal boundary numerically.
The second key result in this paper shows that the optimal control ξ∗ solution of
the MFG can be used (under mild additional assumptions) to construct an ε-Nash
equilibrium in the N -player game. The statement and proof of this fact are given in
Section 4 below, whereas in the next section we prove Theorem 2.4.
3. Construction of the solutions to the MFG
In this section, we provide the complete proof of Theorem 2.4 together with an
intuitive description of the iterative scheme that underpins it. Some of the auxiliary
results used along the way can be found in the Appendix as indicated.
3.1. Description of the iterative scheme. The idea is to start an iterative scheme
based on singular control problems that are analogue to the one in the MFG but without
consistency condition in the mean-field interaction.
We initialise the scheme by setting m[−1](t) ≡ 1, for t ∈ [0, T ]. At the n-th step,
n ≥ 0, assume a non-decreasing, right-continuous function m[n−1] : [0, T ] → [0, 1] is
given and fixed and consider the dynamics
X
[n];t,x
t+s = x+
∫ s
0
a(X
[n];t,x
t+u ,m
[n−1](t+ u))du+
∫ s
0
σ(X
[n];t,x
t+u )dWt+u,(3.1)
Y
[n];t,x,y
t+s = y + (ξt+s − ξt−),
for (x, y) ∈ Σ, s ∈ [0, T − t], t ∈ [0, T ] and where ξ ∈ Ξ(Y0−). As already noticed we
have ξt+ · − ξt− ∈ Ξt(y) and we define the singular control problem SC[n]t,x,y as:
vn(t, x, y) := sup
ξ∈Ξt(y)
Jn(t, x, y; ξ) with
Jn(t, x, y; ξ) := Et,x,y
[∫ T−t
0
e−rsf(X
[n]
t+s, y + ξs)ds−
∫
[0,T−t]
e−rsc0dξs
]
.
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Now, in order to define the (n+ 1)-th step of the algorithm, let us assume that we can
find an optimal control ξ[n]∗ for problem SC
[n]
0,x,y for each (x, y) ∈ Σ. Set Y [n]∗ := y+ξ[n]∗
and assume that (x, y) 7→ Ex,y
[
Y
[n]∗
t
]
is measurable for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, we define
m[n](t) :=
∫
Σ
Ex,y
[
Y
[n]∗
t
]
ν(dx,dy).
The map t 7→ m[n](t) is non-decreasing and right-continuous (by dominated conver-
gence) with values in [0, 1], so we can use it to define (X [n+1], Y [n+1]) and vn+1 by
iterating the above construction.
It is well-known in singular control theory that since y 7→ f(x, y) is concave and the
dynamics of X [n] is independent of the control ξ, then the y-derivative of vn(t, x, y)
corresponds to the value function of an optimal stopping problem. While we will re-
derive this fact in Proposition 3.5 for completeness, here we state the optimal stopping
problem that should be associated to SC
[n]
t,x,y above. For (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ we define
the stopping problem OS
[n]
t,x,y as
un(t, x, y) := inf
τ∈Tt
Un(t, x, y; τ) with
Un(t, x, y; τ) := Et,x
[∫ τ
0
e−rs∂yf(X
[n]
t+s, y)ds+ c0e
−rτ
]
, for τ ∈ Tt
and where Tt is the set of stopping times for the filtration generated by the Brownian
motion in (3.1), with values in [0, T − t]. Since Wt+u−Wt =Wu in law, it is convenient
for the analysis of the stopping problems (and there is no loss of generality) to use
always the same Brownian motion in the dynamics of the process X [n];t,x, irrespectively
of t ∈ [0, T ]. With this convention we have the useful fact that Tt2 ⊂ Tt1 for t1 < t2.
This stopping problem is standard (see, e.g., Peskir and Shiryaev (2006), Chapter I,
Section 2, Theorem 2.2): thanks to Assumption 3 and continuity of the gain process
u 7→
∫ u
0
e−rs∂yf(X
[n]
t+s, y)ds+ c0e
−ru
we know that the smallest optimal stopping time is
τ
[n]
∗ (t, x, y) = inf{s ∈ [0, T − t] : un(t+ s,X [n];t,xt+s , y) = c0}.(3.6)
Letting
Z [n]s := e
−rsun(t+ s,X
[n]
t+s, y) +
∫ s
0
e−ru∂yf(X
[n]
t+u, y)du
we have that, under Pt,x,y,
(Z [n]s )s∈[0,T−t] is a submartingale and
(
Z
[n]
s∧τ
[n]
∗
)
s∈[0,T−t]
is a martingale.
Accordingly, we define the continuation region, C[n], and the stopping region, S [n], of
the optimal stopping problem as
C[n] := {(t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ : un(t, x, y) < c0},
S [n] := {(t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ : un(t, x, y) = c0}.
Finally, we introduce an auxiliary set, which will be used in our analysis
(3.7) H := {(x, y) ∈ R× [0, 1] : ∂yf(x, y)− rc0 < 0}.
Notice that condition (2.6) in Assumption 2 implies that H is not empty. This will be
needed to prove that the continuation and stopping regions are not empty either.
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The rest of our algorithm of proof for Theorem 2.4 goes as follows:
Step 1. Using a probabilistic approach we study in detail continuity and monotonicity
of the value function un, for a generic n ≥ 0.
Step 2. Thanks to the results in step 1 we construct a solution to OS
[n]
t,x,y by determining
the geometry of the stopping region S [n]. In particular we need to prove regu-
larity properties of the optimal stopping boundary ∂C[n] that guarantee that we
can construct a process Y [n]∗ so that the couple (X [n], Y [n]∗) is bound to evolve
in the closure C[n] of the continuation set, by Skorokhod reflection.
Step 3. We confirm that Y [n]∗ is optimal in the singular control problem SC
[n]
t,x,y and
that vn can be constructed by integrating un with respect to y (as already shown
in the existing literature).
Step 4. We prove that the sequence (un)n≥0 is decreasing and use this fact to prove that
the iterative scheme converges to the MFG, in the sense that (X [n], Y [n]∗,m[n])
converges to (X∗, Y ∗,m∗) from Definition 2.2 and that (Y ∗,m∗) are expressed
as in Theorem 2.4.
3.2. Solution of the n-th stopping problem. Here we construct the solution to
problem OS
[n]
t,x,y for a generic n ≥ 0. In particular, t 7→ m[n−1](t) is a given right-
continuous, non-decreasing function bounded between zero and one. First we state a
simple but useful comparison result.
Lemma 3.1 (Comparison). Let Assumption 1 hold and recall that m[n−1] : [0, T ] →
[0, 1] is non-decreasing. Then, for any t ≤ t′ we have
(3.8) P
(
X
[n];t,x
t+s ≤ X [n];t
′,x
t′+s , ∀s ∈ [0, T − t′]
)
= 1,
under the dynamics in (3.1).
Proof. It suffices to compare the drift coefficients in the SDEs for X [n];t,x and X [n];t
′,x
and then apply the comparison result in (Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, Proposition 5.2.18)
(that proof does not use time-continuity of the drift and it is the same as the proof of
Proposition 5.2.13 therein). Set A(x, s) := a(x,m(t+s)) and A′(x, s) := a(x,m(t′+s)).
Since both t 7→ m(t) and m 7→ a(x,m) are non-decreasing (Assumption 1-(ii)), we have
A(x, s) ≤ A′(x, s) for all (x, s) ∈ R × [0, T − t′]. Therefore, applying (Karatzas and
Shreve, 1998, Proposition 5.2.18) we obtain (3.8). 
Next we prove continuity and monotonicity of the value function.
Proposition 3.2 (Value function of OS[n] ). Let Assumptions 1–3 hold. Then the value
function of the optimal stopping problem OS
[n]
t,x,y has the following properties:
(i) 0 ≤ un(t, x, y) ≤ c0;
(ii) the map x 7→ un(t, x, y) is non-decreasing for each fixed (t, y) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1] and
y 7→ un(t, x, y) is non-increasing for each (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R;
(iii) the map t 7→ un(t, x, y) is non-decreasing for each fixed (x, y) ∈ Σ;
(iv) the value function is continuous, i.e., un ∈ C([0, T ]× Σ;R).
Proof. (i). The upper bound is due to un(t, x, y) ≤ Un(t, x, y; 0) = c0. For the lower
bound it is enough to recall that ∂yf ≥ 0 by Assumption 2-(i).
(ii). Fix (t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, 1]. Let x2 > x1 and set τ2 := τ [n]∗ (t, x2, y) as in (3.6),
which is optimal in un(t, x2, y). Then
un(t, x2, y)− un(t, x1, y) ≥ E
[∫ τ2
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
[n];t,x2
t+s , y)− ∂yf(X [n];t,x1t+s , y)
)
ds
]
≥ 0
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because X
[n];t,x2
t+s ≥ X [n];t,x1t+s by uniqueness of the solution to (3.1) and x 7→ ∂yf(x, y) is
increasing by Assumption 2-(i). By a similar argument we also obtain monotonicity in
y, since y 7→ ∂yf(x, y) is decreasing by Assumption 2-(ii).
(iii). For this part of the proof we use Lemma 3.1. Fix (x, y) ∈ Σ and take t2 > t1 in
[0, T ]. Then let τ2 = τ
[n]
∗ (t2, x, y) be optimal in un(t2, x, y) and notice that the stopping
time is also admissible for un(t1, x, y) because Tt2 ⊂ Tt1 . Then
un(t2, x, y)− un(t1, x, y) ≥ E
[∫ τ2
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
[n];t2,x
t2+s , y)− ∂yf(X
[n];t1,x
t1+s , y)
)
ds
]
≥ 0,
where the final inequality uses that X
[n];t2,x
t2+s
≥ X [n];t1,xt1+s for s ∈ [0, T − t2], P-a.s. by
Lemma 3.1 and x 7→ ∂yf(x, y) is non-decreasing by Assumption 2-(i).
(iv). Joint continuity of the value function can be deduced by separate continuity in
each variable and monotonicity (see, e.g., Kruse and Deely (1969)). Thanks to (ii) and
(iii), it suffices to show that un is continuous separately in each variable.
Fix (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ. Let xk → x as k → ∞ and let τ∗ = τ [n]∗ (t, x, y) be optimal
for un(t, x, y). First we show right-continuity of un(t, · , y) and assume that xk ↓ x. For
each k, using monotonicity proven in (ii) we have
0 ≤un(t, xk, y)− un(t, x, y)(3.9)
≤E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
[n];t,xk
t+s , y)− ∂yf(X [n];t,xt+s , y)
)
ds
]
≤E
[∫ T−t
0
e−rs
∣∣∣∂yf(X [n];t,xkt+s , y)− ∂yf(X [n];t,xt+s , y)∣∣∣ ds] .
Taking limits as k →∞, Assumption 3 allow us to use dominated convergence so that
we only need
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∂yf(X [n];t,xkt+s , y)− ∂yf(X [n];t,xt+s , y)∣∣∣ = 0, P− a.s.
The latter holds by continuity of ∂yf and continuity of the flow x 7→ X [n];t,x (which is
guaranteed by Assumption 1).
We can prove left-continuity by analogous arguments. Letting xk ↑ x and, for each
k, selecting the stopping time τk = τ
[n]
∗ (t, xk, y) which is optimal for un(t, xk, y) we get
0 ≤un(t, x, y)− un(t, xk, y)
≤E
[∫ τk
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
[n];t,x
t+s , y)− ∂yf(X [n];t,xkt+s , y)
)
ds
]
.
Then we can conclude as in (3.9). Completely analogous arguments allow to prove
continuity of the value function with respect to y and we omit them here for brevity.
Continuity in time only requires a small adjustment to the argument above. Let
tk → t as k → ∞, with (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ fixed. First let us consider tk ↓ t and set
τ∗ = τ
[n]
∗ (t, x, y), which is optimal for un(t, x, y). Then τ∗ ∧ (T − tk) is admissible for
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un(tk, x, y) and, by the monotonicity proven in (iii), we have
0 ≤u(tk, x, y)− u(t, x, y)
≤E
[∫ τ∗∧(T−tk)
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
[n];tk,x
tk+s
, y)− ∂yf(X [n];t,xt+s , y)
)
ds
]
+ E
[∫ τ∗
τ∗∧(T−tk)
e−rs∂yf(X
[n];t,x
t+s , y)ds
]
≤E
[∫ T−tk
0
e−rs
∣∣∣∂yf(X [n];tk,xtk+s , y)− ∂yf(X [n];t,xt+s , y)∣∣∣ ds]
+ E
[∫ T−t
T−tk
e−rs
∣∣∣∂yf(X [n];t,xt+s , y)∣∣∣ ds] .
Now we can let k → ∞ and use dominated convergence (thanks to Assumption 3),
continuity of the stochastic flow t 7→ Xt,xt+· and continuity of ∂yf (Assumption 2) to
obtain right-continuity of un( · , x, y). An analogous argument allows to prove left-
continuity as well. 
Thanks to the properties of the value function we can easily determine the shape
of the continuation region C[n], whose boundary ∂C[n] turns out to be a surface with
‘nice’ monotonicity properties, that we will subsequently use to obtain a solution of the
singular control problem SC[n]. Part of the proof is based on the following equivalent
representation of the value function:
(3.10) un(t, x, y) = c0 + inf
τ∈Tt
Et,x
[∫ τ
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
[n]
t+s, y)− rc0
)
ds
]
.
Proposition 3.3 (Optimal boundary). Under Assumptions 1–3, the continuation and
stopping regions, C[n] and S [n], are non-empty. The boundary of C[n] can be expressed
as a function cn : [0, T ]× R→ [0, 1], such that
C[n] = {(t, x, y)∈ [0, T ]×Σ : y > cn(t, x)}, S [n] = {(t, x, y)∈ [0, T ]×Σ : y ≤ cn(t, x)}.
The map (t, x) 7→ cn(t, x) is upper semi-continuous with t 7→ cn(t, x) and x 7→ cn(t, x)
non-decreasing (hence cn( · , x) and cn(t, · ) are right-continuous).
Proof. Thanks to (ii) in Proposition 3.2, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R we can define
cn(t, x) := inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : un(t, x, y) < c0} = inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : (t, x, y) ∈ C[n]}(3.11)
with the convention that inf ∅ = 1. Since x 7→ un(t, x, y) and t 7→ un(t, x, y) are
non-decreasing we have, for any ε > 0
(t, x, y) ∈ S [n] =⇒ (t, x+ ε, y) ∈ S [n]
and
(t, x, y) ∈ S [n] =⇒ (t+ ε, x, y) ∈ S [n].
Then, cn is non-decreasing in both t and x.
To show upper semi-continuity we fix (t, x) and take a sequence (tk, xk)k≥1 that
converges to (t, x). Then (tk, xk, cn(tk, xk)) ∈ S [n] for all k’s and, since the stopping
region is closed, in the limit we get
lim sup
k→∞
(tk, xk, cn(tk, xk)) = (t, x, lim sup
k→∞
cn(tk, xk)) ∈ S [n].
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Then, by definition of cn it must be
lim sup
k→∞
cn(tk, xk) ≤ cn(t, x).
It only remains to show that C[n] and S [n] are both non-empty. A standard argument
implies that [0, T ) × H ⊂ C[n] with H the open set in (3.7). Indeed, starting from
(t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )×H and taking the suboptimal strategy
τH := inf{s ∈ [0, T − t] : (X [n];t,xt+s , y) /∈ H}
we easily obtain un(t, x, y) ≤ Un(t, x, y; τH) < c0 by continuity of paths of X [n] and
since Pt,x,y(τH > 0) = 1. So C[n] 6= ∅ because H 6= ∅ thanks to (2.6) in Assumption 2.
We conclude with an argument by contradiction. Assume that S [n] = ∅. Then, given
any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× Σ we have
un(t, x, y) = c0 + E
[∫ T−t
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
[n];t,x
t+s , y)− rc0
)
ds
]
,
thanks to (3.10). Taking limits as x → ∞ and using monotone convergence to pass it
under the expectation and the integral (Assumption 2-(i)) we get
lim
x→∞
un(t, x, y)− c0 = E
[∫ T−t
0
e−rs
(
lim
x→∞
∂yf(X
[n];t,x
t+s , y)− rc0
)
ds
]
> 0
thanks to (2.6). This contradicts un(t, x, y) ≤ c0, hence S 6= ∅. 
3.3. Solution of the n-th singular control problem. Here we follow a well-trodden
path to show that the boundary cn obtained in the section above is actually all we need
to construct the optimal control in the singular control problem SC[n]. First we provide
the candidate optimal control in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Fix (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ and let ξ[n]∗ be defined Pt,x,y-almost surely as
ξ
[n]∗
t+s := sup
0≤u≤s
(
cn(t+ u,X
[n]
t+u)− y
)+
with ξ
[n]∗
t− = 0.
Then, ξ[n]∗ ∈ Ξt,x(y) and realises Pt,x,y-almost surely the Skorokhod reflection of the
process (X [n], Y [n]∗) inside the continuation region C[n], where Y [n]∗ = y + ξ[n]∗. That
is, Pt,x,y-almost surely we have
(i) (X
[n]
t+s, Y
[n]∗
t+s ) ∈ C
[n]
for all s ∈ [0, T − t] (recall that C[n] is the closure of C[n]);
(ii) Minimality condition:∫
[t,T ]
1
{Y
[n]∗
s− >cn(s,X
[n]
s )}
dξ[n]∗s =
∑
t<s≤T
∫ Y [n]∗s
Y
[n]∗
s−
1
{Y
[n]∗
s− +z>cn(s,X
[n]
s )}
dz = 0.(3.12)
Proof. Clearly ξ[n]∗ is non-decreasing, adapted and bounded by 1 − y. So if we prove
that it is also right-continuous we have shown that it belongs to Ξt,x(y). The proof of
right-continuity uses ideas as in De Angelis et al. (2017). For any ε > 0 we have
ξ
[n]∗
t+s ≤ ξ[n]∗t+s+ε = ξ[n]∗t+s ∨ sup
0<u≤ε
(
cn(t+ s+ u,X
[n]
t+s+u)− y
)+
.
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By upper semi-continuity of the boundary and continuity of the trajectories of X [n] we
have
lim
ε→0
sup
0<u≤ε
(
cn(t+ s+ u,X
[n]
t+s+u)− y
)+
= lim sup
u→0
(
cn(t+ s+ u,X
[n]
t+s+u)− y
)+
≤
(
cn(t+ s,X
[n]
t+s)− y
)+
≤ ξ[n]∗t+s
Then, combining the above expressions we get ξ
[n]∗
t+s = limε→0 ξ
[n]∗
t+s+ε as needed.
Next we show the Skorokhod reflection property. By construction we have
Y
[n]∗
t+s = y + ξ
[n]∗
t+s ≥ cn(t+ s,X [n]t+s)
so that (X
[n]
t+s, Y
[n]∗
t+s ) ∈ C
[n]
for all s ∈ [0, T − t] as claimed in (i). For the minimality
condition (ii) fix ω ∈ Ω and let s ∈ [t, T ] be such that Y [n]∗s− (ω) > cn
(
s,X
[n]
s (ω)
)
. Then
by definition of Y [n]∗ and by upper semi-continuity of cn we have
sup
t≤u<s
(
cn
(
u,X [n]u (ω)
)− y)+ > cn(s,X [n]s (ω))− y,(3.13)
which implies Y
[n]∗
s− (ω) = Y
[n]∗
s (ω). The latter and (3.13) imply that there exists δ > 0
such that (
cn
(
s,X [n]s (ω)
)− y)+ ≤ sup
t≤u≤s
(
cn
(
u,X [n]u (ω)
)− y)+ − δ.(3.14)
By upper semi-continuity of s 7→ cn
(
s,X
[n]
s (ω)
)
there must exist s′ > s such that(
cn
(
u,X [n]u (ω)
) − y)+ ≤ (cn(s,X [n]s (ω))− y)+ + δ2
for all u ∈ [s, s′). The latter and (3.14) imply Y [n]∗s− (ω) = Y [n]∗u (ω) for all u ∈ [s, s′).
Hence dξ[n]∗(ω) = 0 on [s, s′) as needed to show that the first term in (3.12) is zero.
For the second term, it is enough to notice that by the explicit form of ξ[n]∗ we easily
derive {∆ξ[n]∗s > 0} = {Y [n]∗s− < c(s,X [n]s )} for any s ∈ [t, T ]. Therefore
Y
[n]∗
s− +∆ξ
[n]∗
s =Y
[n]∗
s− + ξ
[n]∗
s− ∨
(
cn(s,X
[n]
s )− y
)+
− ξ[n]∗s−
=Y
[n]∗
s− +
(
cn(s,X
[n]
s )− Y [n]∗s−
)+
= Y
[n]∗
s− ∨ cn(s,X [n]s ),
as needed (i.e., any jump of the control ξ[n]∗ will bring the controlled process to the
boundary of the continuation set). 
Using the lemma we can now establish optimality of ξ[n]∗ and obtain vn as the integral
of un. The proof of the next proposition follows very closely the proof of Theorem 5.1
in De Angelis et al. (2017), except that here we have a finite-fuel problem (see also
Baldursson and Karatzas (1996); El Karoui and Karatzas (1991) for earlier similar
proofs). So we move it to the appendix for completeness.
Proposition 3.5 (Value function of SC[n]). Let Assumptions 1–3 hold. For any
(t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ we have
vn(t, x, y) = Φn(t, x) −
∫ 1
y
un(t, x, z)dz,
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with
Φn(t, x) := Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
e−rsf(X
[n]
t+s, 1)ds
]
.
Moreover, ξ[n]∗ as in Lemma 3.4 is optimal, i.e., vn(t, x, y) = Jn(t, x, y; ξ
[n]∗).
3.4. Limit of the iterative scheme. Now that we have characterised the solution of
the n-th singular control problem, we turn to the study of convergence of the iterative
scheme. First we show monotonicity of the scheme in terms of the sequence of value
functions (un)n≥0 of the stopping problems.
Proposition 3.6 (Monotonicity of the iterative scheme). Under Assumptions 1–3 we
have un ≥ un+1 on [0, T ]×Σ and cn ≥ cn+1 on [0, T ]×R. Moreover, for any (t, x, y) ∈
[0, T ]× Σ we also have
X
[n]
t+s ≥ X [n+1]t+s and Y [n]∗t+s ≥ Y [n+1]∗t+s for s ∈ [0, T − t], Pt,x,y-a.s.(3.15)
Finally, m[n] ≥ m[n+1] on [0, T ].
Proof. We argue by induction and assume that for some n ≥ 0 we have m[n−1] ≥ m[n]
on [0, T ]. Then, by monotonicity of the drift coefficient (Assumption 1-(ii), we have
a(x,m[n](t)) ≤ a(x,m[n−1](t)) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R. It follows from comparison
results for SDEs (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, Proposition 5.2.18) and (3.1) that
X
[n]
t+s ≥ X [n+1]t+s for all s ∈ [0, T − t], Pt,x-a.s., for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R. By monotonicity
of the profit function (Assumption 2-(i)) we have ∂yf(X
[n+1]
t+s , y) ≤ ∂yf(X [n]t+s, y) and
therefore (3.4) and (3.5) imply un+1 ≤ un on [0, T ] × Σ. The latter and the definition
of the optimal boundary in (3.11) give us cn+1 ≤ cn on [0, T ] × R. Now, using the
definition of the optimal control in Lemma 3.4 we have Pt,x,y-a.s.
ξ
[n+1]∗
t+s = sup
0≤u≤s
(
cn+1(t+ u,X
[n+1]
t+u )− y
)+
≤ sup
0≤u≤s
(
cn(t+ u,X
[n+1]
t+u )− y
)+
≤ sup
0≤u≤s
(
cn(t+ u,X
[n]
t+u)− y
)+
= ξ
[n]∗
t+s ,
where the first inequality is due to cn ≥ cn+1 and the second one to X [n] ≥ X [n+1],
since x 7→ cn(t, x) is non-decreasing (Proposition 3.3). Monotonicity of the optimal
controls implies monotonicity of the optimally controlled processes Y
[n]∗
t+s ≥ Y [n+1]∗t+s for
all s ∈ [0, T − t] and from the latter we obtain
m[n+1](t) =
∫
Σ
Ex,y
[
Y
[n+1]∗
t
]
ν(dx,dy) ≥
∫
Σ
Ex,y
[
Y
[n]∗
t
]
ν(dx,dy) = m[n](t).
So the argument is complete once we show that we can find n ≥ 0 such that m[n−1] ≥
m[n] on [0, T ]. The latter is true in particular for n = 0 since m[−1] ≡ 1 and m[0] ≤ 1
on [0, T ]. 
It is clear that by construction 0 ≤ cn(t, x) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ m[n](t) ≤ 1 for all (t, x) ∈
[0, T ] × R and all n ≥ 0. Moreover, a(x, 0) ≤ a(x,m[n](t)) ≤ a(x, 1) for all (t, x) ∈
[0, T ] × R and all n ≥ 0, so that by the comparison principle X¯0t+s ≤ X [n]t+s ≤ X [0]t+s, for
all s ∈ [0, T − t], Pt,x,y-a.s. for all n ≥ 0 and with X¯0 the solution of (3.1) associated to
a(x, 0).
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By monotonicity of the sequences (un)n≥0, (cn)n≥0 and (m
[n])n≥0 we can define the
functions
u(t, x, y) := lim
n→∞
un(t, x, y), c(t, x) := lim
n→∞
cn(t, x)(3.16)
and m˜(t) := lim
n→∞
m[n](t),
for all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ. Pointwise limit preserves the monotonicity of m˜, c and
u with respect to (t, x, y). Moreover, since un is continuous and cn, m
[n] are upper
semi-continuous for all n ≥ 0 we have that
the functions u, m˜ and c are upper semi-continuous(3.17)
on their respective domains as decreasing limit of upper semi-continuous functions.
Since m˜ is also non-decreasing, then it must be right-continuous.
Notice that for each n ≥ 0 the null set in (3.15) depends on n and (t, x, y) so we
denote it by Nnt,x,y. Then we can define a universal null set Nt,x,y := ∪n≥0Nnt,x,y and for
any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ and all ω ∈ Ω \Nt,x,y we define the processes X˜ and ξ˜ as
X˜t+s(ω) := lim
n→∞
X
[n]
t+s(ω) and ξ˜t+s(ω) := limn→∞
ξ
[n]∗
t+s (ω),(3.18)
for all s ∈ [0, T − t]. We can then set X˜ ≡ 0 and ξ˜ ≡ 0 on Nt,x,y and recall that the
filtration is completed with Pt,x,y-null sets, so that the limit processes are adapted. Of
course we also have
Y˜t := y + ξ˜t = lim
n→∞
Y
[n]∗
t
and thanks to monotone convergence we can immediately establish
m˜(t) = lim
n→∞
∫
Σ
Ex,y
[
Y
[n]∗
t
]
ν(dx,dy) =
∫
Σ
Ex,y
[
Y˜t
]
ν(dx,dy).(3.19)
Notice that here we are using that (x, y) 7→ Ex,y[ξ[n]∗t ] is measurable, thanks to the
explicit expression of ξ[n]∗ and measurability of cn. Therefore (x, y) 7→ Ex,y[ ξ˜t ] is
measurable too as pointwise limit of measurable functions.
We now derive the dynamics of X˜ and show that ξ˜ ∈ Ξ.
Lemma 3.7 (Limit state processes). Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold. For any (t, x, y) ∈
[0, T ]× Σ the process X˜ is the unique strong solution of
(3.20) X˜t+s = x+
∫ s
0
a
(
X˜t+u, m˜(t+ u)
)
du+
∫ s
0
σ
(
X˜t+u
)
dWt+u, s ∈ [0, T − t],
and the process ξ˜ belongs to Ξt,x(y).
Proof. Fix (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ. The first observation is that X˜ and ξ˜ are (Ft+s)s≥0-
adapted processes as pointwise limit of adapted processes on Ω \ Nt,x,y and by Pt,x,y-
completeness of the filtration. Since ξ˜ is decreasing limit of right-continuous non-
decreasing processes (hence upper semi-continuous), then it is also non-decreasing and
upper-semi continuous. The latter two properties imply right-continuity of the limit
process ξ˜ as well. Since ξ
[n]∗
t− = 0 and ξ
[n]∗
T ≤ 1 − y for all n ≥ 0 we also have ξ˜t− = 0
and ξ˜T ≤ 1− y. Hence ξ˜ ∈ Ξt,x(y).
Let us now prove (3.20). Denote by X ′ the unique strong solution of (3.20) and let
us show that X˜ = X ′. By standard estimates and using Lipschitz continuity of the drift
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a( · ) (Assumption 1-(i))we have
Et,x
[
sup
0≤s≤T−t
∣∣∣X [n]t+s −X ′t+s∣∣∣2
]
≤ 2Et,x
[
L · T
∫ T−t
0
(∣∣X [n]t+s −X ′t+s∣∣2 + ∣∣m[n](t+ s)− m˜(t+ s)∣∣2) ds]
+ 2Et,x
[
sup
0≤s≤T−t
∣∣∣∣∫ s
0
(
σ(X
[n]
t+s)− σ(X ′t+s)
)
dWt+s
∣∣∣∣2
]
.
Since σ enjoys linear growth and X [n] and X ′ are solutions of SDEs with Lipschitz
coefficients, then
s 7→
∫ s
0
(
σ(X
[n]
t+s)− σ(X ′t+s)
)
dWt+s
is a martingale on [0, T − t] and we can use Doob’s inequality to get
Et,x
[
sup
0≤s≤T−t
∣∣∣∣∫ s
0
(
σ(X
[n]
t+s)− σ(X ′t+s)
)
dWt+s
∣∣∣∣2
]
≤ 4Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
(
σ(X
[n]
t+s)− σ(X ′t+s)
)2
ds
]
≤ 4L2Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
∣∣X [n]t+s −X ′t+s∣∣2ds] ,
Combining the estimates above and using Gronwall’s inequality we obtain
Et,x
[
sup
0≤s≤T−t
∣∣∣X [n]t+s −X ′t+s∣∣∣2
]
≤ c
∫ T−t
0
∣∣m[n](t+ s)− m˜(t+ s)|2ds,
for some constant c > 0. Letting n → ∞ and using bounded convergence and the
definition of m˜ we conclude. 
Next we connect u( · ) and c( · ) with an optimal stopping problem for X˜. Recall that
u and c are upper semi-continuous by (3.17) and enjoy the same monotonicity properties
of un and cn.
Lemma 3.8 (Limit optimal stopping problem). Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold. Then,
for all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ we have
u(t, x, y) = inf
τ∈Tt
U(t, x, y; τ) with
U(t, x, y; τ) := Et,x
[∫ τ
0
e−rs∂yf(X˜t+s, y)ds+ c0e
−rτ
](3.21)
and
c(t, x) = inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : u(t, x, y) < c0} with inf ∅ = 1.
In particular c is the boundary of the set
C := {(t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ : u(t, x, y) < c0}(3.22)
and, moreover, both C and S := ([0, T ] × Σ) \ C are not empty.
Proof. Since X [n] ≥ X˜ for all n ≥ 0 and x 7→ ∂yf(x, y) is non-decreasing, for any τ ∈ Tt
we have Un(t, x, y; τ) ≥ U(t, x, y; τ) and therefore
u(t, x, y) = lim
n→∞
inf
τ∈Tt
Un(t, x, y; τ) ≥ inf
τ∈Tt
U(t, x, y; τ).
Now, given ε > 0 we can find a stopping time τε ∈ Tt such that
inf
τ∈Tt
U(t, x, y; τ) + ε ≥ U(t, x, y; τε).
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Moreover, by dominated convergence (Assumption 3) and continuity of ∂yf we have
U(t, x, y; τε) = Et,x
[∫ τε
0
e−rs lim
n→∞
∂yf(X
[n]
t+s, y)ds+ c0e
−rτε
]
= lim
n→∞
Un(t, x, y; τε).
So combining the above we get
inf
τ∈Tt
U(t, x, y; τ) + ε ≥ lim
n→∞
Un(t, x, y; τε) ≥ lim
n→∞
un(t, x, y) = u(t, x, y)
and since ε > 0 was arbitrary we conclude
u(t, x, y) ≤ inf
τ∈Tt
U(t, x, y; τ)
as needed for the first claim.
Let us next prove that c coincides with the optimal stopping boundary for the limit
problem. Since u ≤ un for all n ≥ 0 we have
cn(t, x) = inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : un(t, x, y) < c0} ≥ inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : u(t, x, y) < c0}
so that
c(t, x) ≥ inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : u(t, x, y) < c0}.
For the reverse inequality, let us fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R, take η ∈ [0, 1] such that
η > inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : u(t, x, y) < c0}.(3.23)
Then there must be δ > 0 such that u(t, x, η) ≤ c0 − δ. By pointwise convergence,
there exists nδ ≥ 0 such that un(t, x, η) ≤ u(t, x, η) + δ/2 for all n ≥ nδ and therefore,
un(t, x, η) ≤ c0 − δ/2 for all n ≥ nδ. Hence, η > cn(t, x) for all n ≥ nδ and η > c(t, x)
too. The result holds for any η ∈ [0, 1] such that (3.23) is true and therefore
c(t, x) ≤ inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : u(t, x, y) < c0}.
Since y 7→ u(t, x, y) is decreasing it is clear that c is the boundary of the set C defined
in (3.22).
The exact same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.3 apply to the stopping
problem with value u and allow us to show that C 6= ∅ and S 6= ∅ thanks to (2.6) in
Assumption 2. 
Thanks to the probabilistic representation of u we can use the same arguments as in
the proof of Proposition 3.2 to show that u indeed fulfils the same properties as un.
Corollary 3.9. Under Assumptions 1-3 the function u satisfies (i)–(iv) in Proposition
3.2.
In what follows we let
τ∗(t, x, y) = inf{s ∈ [0, T − t] : u(t+ s, X˜t,xt+s, y) = c0},(3.24)
which is optimal for the limit problem with value u(t, x, y). Continuity of the value
function allows a simple proof of convergence of optimal stopping times. The result is
of independent interest and might be used for numerical approximation of the optimal
stopping rule τ∗. We state the result here but put its proof in the appendix as it will
not be needed in the rest of the paper.
Lemma 3.10. For all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ we have τ [n]∗ ↑ τ∗, Pt,x,y-a.s., as n→∞.
Since the dynamics of (X˜t)t∈[0,T ] is fully specified and we have obtained a solution of
the optimal stopping problem with value u (Lemma 3.8), we can state a result similar
to Proposition 3.5.
20 L. CAMPI, T. DE ANGELIS, M. GHIO, G. LIVIERI
Proposition 3.11. Let Assumptions 1–3 hold and let X˜ be specified as in Lemma 3.7.
Define
vˆ(t, x, y) := sup
ξ∈Ξt,x(y)
Jˆ(t, x, y; ξ) with
Jˆ(t, x, y; ξ) := Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
e−rsf(X˜t+s, y + ξs)ds−
∫
[0,T−t]
e−rsc0dξs
]
.
(3.25)
Then, for any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ we have
vˆ(t, x, y) = Φ(t, x)−
∫ 1
y
u(t, x, z)dz with Φ(t, x) := Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
e−rsf(X˜t+s, 1)ds
]
.
Moreover,
ξ∗t+s := sup
0≤u≤s
(
c(t+ u, X˜t+u)− y
)+
with ξ∗t− = 0,(3.26)
is the unique optimal control in (3.25), up to indistinguishability.
Remark 3.12. Before passing to the proof we would like to emphasise that at this stage
we are not claiming that (m˜, ξ∗) is a solution of the MFG because m˜ is specified in
(3.19) and a priori the consistency condition may not hold. Hence, a priori vˆ is not the
function v defined in (2.5). Of course uniqueness of the optimal control also holds in
Proposition 3.5 albeit not stated there.
Proof. We only need to prove uniqueness of the optimal control as all remaining claims
are obtained by repeating verbatim the proof of Proposition 3.5. As usual, uniqueness
follows by strict concavity of the map y 7→ f(x, y), convexity of the set Ξt,x(y) of
admissible controls and an argument by contradiction.
For notational simplicity and with no loss of generality we take t = 0. Assume that
η ∈ Ξ0,x(y) is another optimal control. Since, η and ξ∗ are both right-continuous they
are indistinguishable as soon as they are modifications, i.e. Px,y(ξ
∗
s = ηs) = 1 for all
s ∈ [0, T ]. Arguing by contradiction assume there exists s0 ∈ [0, T ) such that 3p :=
Px,y(ξ
∗
s0 6= ηs0) > 0. Then, there also exists ε > 0 such that Px,y(|ξ∗s0 − ηs0 | ≥ ε) ≥ 2p
and, by right-continuity of the paths, there exists s1 > s0 such that
Px,y
(
inf
s0≤u≤s1
|ξ∗u − ηu| ≥ ε
)
≥ p > 0.
Let us denote
A0 :=
{
ω : inf
s0≤u≤s1
|ξ∗u(ω)− ηu(ω)| ≥ ε
}
.(3.27)
For any λ ∈ (0, 1), since η and ξ∗ are both optimal, we have
vˆ(0, x, y) =λJˆ(0, x, y; η) + (1− λ)Jˆ(0, x, y; ξ∗)
=Ex
[∫ T
0
e−rs
[
λf(X˜s, y + ηs) + (1− λ)f(X˜s, y + ξ∗s )
]
ds
]
− Ex
[∫
[0,T ]
e−rsc0(λdηs + (1− λ)dξ∗s)
]
.
Now, letting ζλ := λη + (1 − λ)ξ∗ it is immediate to check that ζλ ∈ Ξ0,x(y) and, by
strict concavity of y 7→ f(x, y) (and joint continuity of f), we have
1A0
[
λf(X˜s, y + ηs) + (1− λ)f(X˜s, y + ξ∗s)
]
< 1A0f(X˜s, y + ζ
λ
s ), for s ∈ [s0, s1]
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with 1A0 the indicator of the event in (3.27). Since P0,x(A0) > 0 and s0 < s1, the strict
inequality holds for the expected values as well. Hence we reach the contradiction
vˆ(0, x, y) < Jˆ(0, x, y; ζλ),
which concludes the proof. 
3.5. Solution of the MFG. In this section we first show that ξ˜ obtained in the previ-
ous section (see (3.18)) is optimal for the control problem in Proposition 3.11 and then
conclude that (m˜, ξ˜) solves the MFG.
Proposition 3.13. Let Assumptions 1–3 hold, take ξ˜ as in (3.18), m˜ as in (3.19) and
X˜ as in Lemma 3.7. Then
vˆ(t, x, y) = Jˆ(t, x, y; ξ˜), for any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ
and ξ˜ is indistinguishable from ξ∗ as in (3.26).
Proof. We only need to prove optimality of ξ˜ as the rest follows by uniqueness of the
optimal control (Proposition 3.11).
Recall the value function vn of SC
[n] (see (3.2)–(3.3)) and its expression from Propo-
sition 3.5. Using dominated convergence we obtain
lim
n→∞
(
Φn(t, x)−
∫ 1
y
un(t, x, z)dz
)
= Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
e−rs lim
n→∞
f(X
[n]
t+s, 1)ds
]
−
∫ 1
y
lim
n→∞
un(t, x, z)dz = vˆ(t, x, y),
where the final equality is due to (3.16), (3.18) and Proposition 3.11. Therefore we have
lim
n→∞
vn(t, x, y) = vˆ(t, x, y).
Since vn(t, x, y) = Jn(t, x, y; ξ
[n]∗), if we can show that
lim
n→∞
Jn(t, x, y; ξ
[n]∗) = Jˆ(t, x, y; ξ˜),
the proof is complete. The latter is not difficult, indeed by integration by parts and
dominated convergence we have
lim
n→∞
Jn(t, x, y; ξ
[n]∗)
= lim
n→∞
Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
e−rsf(X
[n]
t+s, y + ξ
[n]∗
t+s )ds− c0e−r(T−t)ξ[n]∗T − rc0
∫ T−t
0
e−rsξ
[n]∗
t+sds
]
= Et,x
[ ∫ T−t
0
e−rs lim
n→∞
f(X
[n]
t+s, y + ξ
[n]∗
t+s )ds
− c0e−r(T−t) lim
n→∞
ξ
[n]∗
T − rc0
∫ T−t
0
e−rs lim
n→∞
ξ
[n]∗
t+sds
]
= Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
e−rsf(X˜t+s, y + ξ˜t+s)ds− c0e−r(T−t)ξ˜T − rc0
∫ T−t
0
e−rsξ˜t+sds
]
= Jˆ(t, x, y; ξ˜ ),
where the penultimate equality comes from (3.18) and the final one is obtained by
undoing the integration by parts. 
By construction Y˜ and m˜ fulfil the consistency condition (3.19) hence we have a
simple corollary.
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Corollary 3.14. The pair (m˜, ξ˜) is a solution of the MFG as in Definition 2.2. Since
ξ˜ is indistinguishable from ξ∗ in (3.26) then Theorem 2.4 holds with
X∗ = X˜, Y ∗ = Y0− + ξ˜ = Y0− + ξ
∗ and m∗ = m˜.
As a byproduct of this result and of Proposition 3.11 we also have that the classical
connection between singular stochastic control and optimal stopping still holds in our
specific mean-field game.
4. Approximate Nash equilibria for the N-player game
4.1. The N-player game: setting and assumptions. Here we start with a formal
description of the N -player game sketched in the introduction.
Let Π := (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual
conditions, supporting an infinite sequence of independent one-dimensional F-Brownian
motions (W i)∞i=1, as well as i.i.d. F0-measurable initial states (Xi0, Y i0 )∞i=1 with common
distribution ν ∈ P(Σ), independent of the Brownian motions. For each N ≥ 1, define
F
N = (F0 ∨FNt )t≥0, where (FNt )t≥0 is the augmented filtration generated by the Brow-
nian motions (W i)Ni=1. Then the filtered probability spaces Π
N := (Ω,F ,FN ,P) satisfy
the usual conditions. These are the spaces on which we define strong solutions of the
N -player systems.
Each player i = 1, . . . , N observes/controls her own private state process (XN,i, Y N,i),
whose dynamics is
XN,it = X
i
0 +
∫ t
0
a(XN,is ,m
N
s ) ds +
∫ t
0
σ(XN,is ) dW
i
s,
Y N,it = Y
i
0− + ξ
N,i
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
(4.1)
where ξN,i ∈ ΞΠN (Y i0−) is the strategy chosen by the i-th player, while mN is the
mean-field interaction term given by
mNt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y N,it =
∫
Σ
y µNt (dx,dy), µ
N
t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ
(XN,it ,Y
N,i
t )
.
The process µNt above denotes the empirical distribution of the players’ states, with δz
the Dirac delta mass at z ∈ Σ.
In the rest of this section we use the notation
ΞN (Y0−) = {(ξi)Ni=1 : ξi ∈ ΞΠ
N
(Y i0−) for all i = 1, . . . N }.
We will also consider the dynamics of (XN , Y N ) conditionally on specific initial condi-
tions (x,y) := (xi, yi)Ni=1 drawn independently from the common initial distribution ν.
Therefore, the dynamics of the state variables under Px,y reads
XN,it = x
i +
∫ t
0
a(XN,is ,m
N
s ) ds+
∫ t
0
σ(XN,is ) dW
i
s,
Y N,it = y
i + ξN,it , t ∈ [0, T ].
Accordingly, since the initial conditions (x,y) = (xi, yi)Ni=1 are drawn from the N -fold
product of the measure ν, denoted νN , the expected payoff of the i-th player is given
by
JN,i(ξN ) :=
∫
ΣN
JN,i(x,y; ξN )νN (dx,dy),
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where
JN,i(x,y; ξN ) := Ex,y
[∫ T
0
e−rtf
(
XN,it , Y
N,i
t
)
dt−
∫
[0,T ]
e−rtc0dξ
N,i
t
]
.
Definition 4.1 (ε-Nash equilibrium for theN -player game). Given ε ≥ 0, an admissible
strategy vector ξε ∈ ΞN (Y0−) is called ε-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game of
capacity expansion if for every i = 1, . . . , N and for every admissible individual strategy
ξi ∈ ΞΠN (Y i0−), we have
JN,i(ξε) ≥ JN,i([ξε,−i, ξi])− ε,
where [ξε,−i, ξi] denotes the N -player strategy vector that is obtained from ξε by replacing
the i-th entry with ξi.
In order to construct ε-Nash equilibria using the optimal control obtained in the
MFG it is convenient to make an additional set of assumptions on the profit function.
Assumption 4. The running payoff f is locally Lipschitz, i.e.
|f(x, y)− f(x′, y′)| ≤ Λ(x, x′)(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|), (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ Σ.
Moreover, there exists q > 1 such that the function Λ : R × R → R+ satisfies the
integrability condition
(4.2) C(Λ, q) := sup
N∈N
sup
ξN,1
E
[∫ T
0
Λq(XN,1t ,X
∗
t )dt
]
<∞
where XN,1 is the solution of (4.1), X∗ = X˜ is the solution of (2.1) obtained in the MFG
(see also (3.20)) and the supremum is taken over all admissible controls ξN,1 ∈ ΞΠN (Y 10−)
and all N ∈ N.
The integrability condition (4.2) is redundant if f is Lipschitz continuous. Since
Y N,1 ∈ [0, 1] there is no loss of generality in taking Λ independent of y and the supremum
over ξN,1 is not restrictive either. If Λ has polynomial growth of order p ≥ 1, then (4.2)
holds thanks to the Lipschitz continuity of the coefficients a(x,m) and σ(x) as soon
as E[(X0)
p·q] < ∞. Later in Section 4.4 we will consider and example where Λ has
exponential growth and (4.2) holds.
The next is an assumption on the optimal boundary found in Theorem 2.4.
Assumption 5. The optimal boundary (t, x) 7→ c(t, x) of Theorem 2.4 is uniformly
Lipschitz continuous in x with constant θc > 0, i.e.
sup
0≤t≤T
|c(t, x) − c(t, x′)| ≤ θc|x− x′|, x, x′ ∈ R.
Lipschitz regularity of optimal stopping/control boundaries is a delicate issue in gen-
eral. However, the question can be addressed by analytical methods (see, e.g., Soner
and Shreve (1991)) or by probabilistic methods as in De Angelis and Stabile (2019). In
Section 4.3 we show how ideas from the latter paper can be used in our context to prove
that Assumption 5 indeed holds in a large class of examples.
4.2. Approximate Nash equilibria. Here we prove that the MFG solution con-
structed in Theorem 2.4 induces approximate Nash equilibria in the N -player game
of capacity expansion, when N is large enough.
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Theorem 4.2 (Approximate Nash equilibiria for theN -player game). Suppose Assump-
tions 1–5 hold. Recall the feedback solution (m∗, ξ∗) of the MFG of capacity expansion
constructed in Theorem 2.4. Recall also that
ξ∗t = η
∗(t,X∗, Y0−), t ∈ [0, T ],
with η∗ : [0, T ]× C([0, T ];R) × [0, 1]→ [0, 1] the non-anticipative mapping defined by
η∗(t, ϕ, y) := sup
0≤s≤t
(
c(s, ϕ(s)) − y
)+
and with X∗ the dynamics in (2.1) associated to m∗. Setting ξˆN,it := η
∗(t,XN,i, Y i0−),
the vector ξˆN is a εN -Nash equilibrium for the N -player game of capacity expansion
according to Definition 4.1 with εN → 0 as N → ∞. Further, if q = 2 in (4.2) of
Assumption 4, then the rate of convergence is of order N−1/2.
Proof. For each Brownian motion W i we introduce the following auxiliary dynamics,
which are the analogues of the solution (X∗, Y ∗) of (2.1) with (ξ∗,m∗) as in Theorem
2.4:
Xit = X
i
0 +
∫ t
0
a(Xis,m
∗(s))ds +
∫ t
0
σ(Xis)dW
i
s,
Y it = Y
i
0− + ζ
i
t := Y0− + η
∗(t,Xi, Y i0−), t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
(4.3)
Notice that the initial conditions above are the same as in the dynamics of (XN,i, Y N,i).
Moreover, (Xit , Y
i
t )
∞
i=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with values in R× [0, 1],
so that in particular the law of large numbers (LLN) holds. The rest of the proof is
structured in three steps:
(i) We prove that JN,1(ξˆN )→ J(ξ∗) as N →∞.
(ii) Recalling the notation [ξˆN,−1, ξ] = (ξ, ξˆN,2, . . . , ξˆN,N ) introduced in Definition
4.1 we prove
lim sup
N→∞
sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
JN,1([ξˆN,−1, ξ]) ≤ J(ξ∗) = V ν .
(iii) Combining (i) and (ii), for any ε > 0 there exists Nε ∈ N such that
JN,1(ξˆN ) ≥ sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
JN,1([ξˆN,−1, ξ]) − ε
for all N ≥ Nε.
In the three steps above we singled out the first player with no loss of generality since
the N -player game is symmetric.
(i) Let us start by observing that (X∗, Y ∗, ξ∗) from Theorem 2.4 and (X1, Y 1, ζ1)
defined above have the same law, so that
J(ξ∗) = E
[∫ T
0
e−rsf(X1t , Y
1
t )dt− c0
∫
[0,T ]
e−rtdζ1t
]
.
By triangular inequality we get
|JN,1(ξˆN )− J(ξ∗)| ≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−rt
∣∣∣f(XˆN,1t , Yˆ N,1t )− f(X1t , Y 1t )∣∣∣dt](4.4)
+ c0E
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[0,T ]
e−rtd
(
ξˆN,1t − ζ1t
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
,
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where we use (XˆN,i, Yˆ N,i) for the state process of the i-th player when all players use
the control vector ξˆN . Similarly we denote by mˆN the empirical average of the processes
Yˆ N,i.
We estimate the first term on the right-hand side using Assumption 4 and obtain
E
[∫ T
0
e−rt
∣∣∣f(XˆN,1t , Yˆ N,1t )− f(X1t , Y 1t )∣∣∣dt]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
e−rtΛ(XˆN,1t ,X
1
t )
(|XˆN,1t −X1t |+ |Yˆ N,1t − Y 1t |)dt]
≤ C1E
[∫ T
0
Λq(XˆN,1t ,X
1
t )dt
] 1
q
E
[∫ T
0
(|XˆN,1t −X1t |p + |Yˆ N,1t − Y 1t |p)dt]
1
p
≤ C1C(Λ, q)E
[∫ T
0
(|XˆN,1t −X1t |p + |Yˆ N,1t − Y 1t |p)dt]
1
p
,
for some positive constant C1 = C1(T, q), using Ho¨lder’s inequality with p = q/(q − 1)
and q > 1 as in Assumption 4. For the remaining term in (4.4) we use integration by
parts and ξˆN,10− = ζ
1
0− = 0 to obtain
E
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[0,T ]
e−rtd
(
ξˆN,1t − ζ1t
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
= E
[∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
e−rt
(
ξˆN,1t − ζ1t
)
dt
∣∣∣∣] ≤ E [∫ T
0
e−rt
∣∣∣ξˆN,1t − ζ1t ∣∣∣dt] .
Recall that ξˆN,1t = η
∗(t, XˆN,1, Y 10−) and ζ
1
t = η
∗(t,X1, Y 10−). Then using Assumption 5
we obtain ∣∣∣ξˆN,1t − ζ1t ∣∣∣ ≤ sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣c(s, XˆN,1s )− c(s,X1s )∣∣ ≤ θc sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣XˆN,1s −X1s ∣∣(4.5)
and the same bound also holds for |Yˆ N,1t − Y 1t |. Then, combining the above estimates
we arrive at
|JN,1(ξˆN )− J(ξ∗)| ≤C1C(Λ, q)T (1 + θc)E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|XˆN,1t −X1t |p
] 1
p
(4.6)
+ c0θcT E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣XˆN,1s −X1s ∣∣] .
Since p > 1 it remains to show that
lim
N→∞
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|XˆN,1t −X1t |p
]
= 0.(4.7)
Repeating the same estimates as those in the proof of Lemma 3.7 but with (XˆN,1,X1)
instead of (X [n],X ′) and with (mˆN ,m∗) instead of (m[n], m˜) we obtain
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|XˆN,1t −X1t |p
]
≤ C E
[∫ T
0
∣∣mˆNt −m∗(t)∣∣p dt] ,(4.8)
for some constant C > 0 depending on p, T and the Lipschitz constant of the coefficients
a( · ) and σ( · ).
Now, observe that
(4.9) εp,N :=
∫ T
0
E
[ ∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
Y it −m∗(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
p ]
dt→ 0, N →∞,
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by the LLN and the bounded convergence theorem, since (Y it )
N
i=1 are i.i.d. with mean
m∗(t) (recall that η∗ is the feedback map of the optimal control in the MFG). Hence,
we have
E
[∫ T
0
|mˆNt −m∗(t)|pdt
]
≤2p−1
∫ T
0
E
[ ∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
(Yˆ N,it − Y it )
∣∣∣∣∣
p ]
dt+ 2p−1εp,N
≤2p−1
∫ T
0
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
[
|Yˆ N,it − Y it |p
]
dt+ 2p−1εp,N(4.10)
=2p−1
∫ T
0
E
[ ∣∣∣Yˆ N,1t − Y 1t ∣∣∣p ]dt+ 2p−1εp,N
≤2p−1θpc
∫ T
0
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣XˆN,1s −X1s ∣∣∣p ]dt+ 2p−1εp,N
where the first inequality uses |a+ b|p ≤ 2p−1(|a|p + |b|p), the second inequality follows
by Jensen’s inequality (p > 1), the equality by the fact that the processes (Yˆ N,i−Y i)Ni=1
are exchangeable and the final inequality uses (4.5) applied to |Yˆ N,1t − Y 1t |.
Plugging the latter estimate back into (4.8) and applying Gronwall’s lemma once
again we obtain
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|XˆN,1t −X1t |p
]
≤ C ′εp,N ,
for a suitable constant C ′ > 0 depending on T and the other constants above. Thanks
to (4.9) we obtain (4.7).
(ii). This part of the proof is similar to the above but now the first player deviates
by choosing a generic admissible control ξ while all remaining players pick ξˆN,i, i =
2, . . . , N ; we denote this strategy vector βN = [ξˆN,−1, ξ]. In particular we notice that
the empirical average associated to this strategy reads
1
N
(
Y 10− + ξt +
N∑
i=2
(Y i0− + ξˆ
N,i
t )
)
= m¯Nt +
1
N
(ξt − ξˆN,1t ),
where m¯Nt := N
−1
∑N
i=1(Y
i
0−+ ξˆ
N,i
t ). One should be careful here that m¯
N is different to
mˆN used in the proof of (i) above, because the deviation of player 1 from the strategy
vector ξˆN causes a knock-on effect on the dynamics of ξˆN,i for all i’s through the non-
anticipative mapping η∗(t,XN,i;β , Y i0−). To keep track of this subtle aspect we use the
notations ξˆN,i;βt = η
∗(t,XN,i;β , Y i0−) and Y¯
N,i;β
t = Y
i
0− + ξˆ
N,i;β
t , for i = 1, . . . , N , in the
calculations below. Accordingly, the state process of the first player reads
XN,1;βt = X
1
0 +
∫ t
0
a
(
XN,1;βs , m¯
N
s +N
−1(ξs − ξˆN,1;βs )
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σ(XN,1;βs )dW
1
s
Y N,1;βt = Y
1
0− + ξt, t ∈ [0, T ].
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Using the above expression for XN,1;β and the same arguments as in (4.8) we obtain
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|XN,1;βt −X1t |p
]
≤ C E
[∫ T
0
∣∣∣m¯Nt +N−1(ξt − ξˆN,1;βt )−m∗(t)∣∣∣p dt]
≤ 2p−1C E
[∫ T
0
∣∣m¯Nt −m∗(t)∣∣p dt]+ 2p2p−1CTN−p,
where the final inequality uses |a + b|p ≤ 2p−1(|a|p + |b|p) and |ξt − ξˆN,1;βt | ≤ 2 (by the
finite-fuel condition), and C > 0 is a suitable constant. Repeating the same steps as in
(4.10) we have
E
[∫ T
0
|m¯Nt −m∗(t)|pdt
]
≤2p−1
∫ T
0
E
[ ∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
(Y¯ N,i;βt − Y it )
∣∣∣∣∣
p ]
dt+ 2p−1εp,N
≤2p−1
∫ T
0
E
[ ∣∣∣Y¯ N,1;βt − Y 1t ∣∣∣p ]dt+ 2p−1εp,N
≤2p−1θpc
∫ T
0
E
[
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣∣XN,1;βs −X1s ∣∣∣p ]dt+ 2p−1εp,N
where we have used that (Y¯ N,i;β−Y i)Ni=1 are exchangeable by construction. Combining
the two estimates above and using Gronwall’s inequality we obtain a bound which is
uniform with respect to ξ ∈ ΞΠN (Y 10−). In particular we have
lim
N→∞
sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|XN,1;βt −X1t |p
]
≤ C ′ lim
N→∞
εp,N = 0,(4.11)
where C ′ > 0 is the constant appearing from Gronwall’s inequality. Since any ξ ∈
ΞΠ
N
(Y 10−) is admissible but suboptimal in the MFG with state process X
1 as in (4.3)
we get
sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
JN,1([ξˆN,−1, ξ])− V ν
≤ sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
(
JN,1([ξˆN,−1, ξ])− J(ξ)
)
≤ sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
E
[∫ T
0
e−rs
(
f
(
XN,1;βt , Y
1
0− + ξt
)− f(X1t , Y 10− + ξt))dt]
≤ sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
E
[∫ T
0
e−rtΛ
(
XN,1;βt ,X
1
t
)∣∣XN,1;βt −X1t ∣∣dt]
where in the final inequality we used Assumption 4. Now, arguing as in (i) and using
(4.11) and (4.2) we obtain
lim sup
N→∞
sup
ξ∈ΞΠN (Y 10−)
JN,1
(
[ξˆN,−1, ξ]
) ≤ V ν = J(ξ∗),
where the final equality holds by optimality of ξ∗ in the MFG.
(iii). This step follows from the previous two. With no loss of generality we consider
only the first player as the game is symmetric. Given ε > 0, thanks to (ii) there exists
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Nε > 0 sufficiently large that for any ξ ∈ ΞΠN (Y 10−)
JN,1([ξˆN,−1, ξ]) ≤ V ν + ε
2
for all N > Nε.
From (i), with no loss of generality we can also assume Nε > 0 sufficiently such large
that
JN,1(ξˆN ) ≥ V ν − ε
2
for all N > Nε.
Combining the two inequalities above we obtain that for all ξ ∈ ΞΠN (Y 10−) holds
JN,1(ξˆN ) ≥ JN,1([ξˆN,−1, ξ])− ε for all N > Nε.
The final claim on the speed of convergence can be verified by taking q = p = 2 in
the above estimates. The leading term in the convergence of (4.6) is
√
ε2,N (see (4.11)).
Since (4.9) reads
ε2,N =
∫ T
0
Var
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y it
)
dt =
1
N
∫ T
0
Var(Y 1t ) dt
upon noticing that E
[
N−1
∑N
i=1 Y
i
t
]
= E[Y 1t ] = m
∗(t) since (Y i)Ni=1 are i.i.d., the claim
follows. 
4.3. Conditions for a Lipschitz continuous optimal boundary. Here we comple-
ment results from De Angelis and Stabile (2019) to provide sufficient conditions under
which Assumption 5 holds. Notice that our problem is parabolic and degenerate as
there is no diffusive dynamics in the y-direction. Therefore classical PDE results can-
not be applied. Moreover, we extend De Angelis and Stabile (2019) by considering
non-constant diffusion coefficients in the the dynamics of X∗. Thanks to Lemma 3.8,
the question reduces to finding sufficient conditions on the data of the optimal stopping
problem (3.21) that guarantee a Lipschitz stopping boundary. In (3.21) the dynamics of
X˜ was obtained from Lemma 3.7 and corresponds to the dynamics of X∗ in the MFG.
In the rest of this section we always use such X∗.
We make some additional assumptions on the coefficients of the SDE.
Assumption 6. We have x 7→ a(x,m) and x 7→ σ(x) continuously differentiable with
∂xσ(x) ≥ 0 and ∂xa(x,m) ≤ a¯ for some a¯ > 0.
Thanks to this assumption we have that the stochastic flow x 7→ X∗; t,x(ω) is contin-
uously differentiable. The dynamics of Zt,x := ∂xX
∗; t,x is given by (see Protter, 2005,
Chapter V.7)
Zt,xt+s = 1 +
∫ s
0
∂xa(X
∗; t,x
t+u ,m
∗(t+u))Zt,xt+udu+
∫ s
0
∂xσ(X
∗; t,x
t+u )Z
t,x
t+u dWt+u,(4.12)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R and s ∈ [0, T − t]. The solution of (4.12) is explicit in terms of
X∗ and it reads
Zt,xt+s = exp
[ ∫ s
0
(
∂xa(X
∗; t,x
t+u ,m
∗(t+ u))− 1
2
∂xσ(X
∗; t,x
t+u )
2
)
du+
∫ s
0
∂xσ(X
t,x
t+u) dWt+u
]
,
for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R and s ∈ [0, T − t]. Thanks to this explicit formula we can deduce
that (t, x) 7→ Zt,x is a continuous flow, by continuity of the flow (t, x) 7→ X∗; t,x.
Later on we will perform a change of measure using Z and for that we also require:
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Assumption 7. For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R we have
Et,x
[∫ T−t
0
(
∂xσ(X
∗
t+u)Zt+u
)2
du
]
< +∞.
Then
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
FT
:= ZT exp
(
−
∫ T
0
∂xa(X
∗
t ,m
∗(t))dt
)
(4.13)
defines the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the absolutely continuous change of measure
from P to Q.
Next we assume some extra conditions on the profit function.
Assumption 8. We have f ∈ C2(R × (0, 1)) and either σ(x) = σ is constant or we
have x 7→ ∂xyf(x, y) non-increasing. Moreover, the integrability condition below holds:
sup
(t,x,y)∈K
Et,x,y
[∫ T−t
0
e−rs
( ∣∣∂yyf(X∗t+s, y)∣∣+ (1 + Zt+s) ∣∣∂xyf(X∗t+s, y)∣∣ )ds] <∞,
for any compact K ⊂ [0, T ]× Σ.
Notice that f(x, y) = xαyβ with α ∈ (0, 1] and β ∈ (0, 1) satisfies Assumption 8
combined with Assumption 1. The next proposition provides sufficient conditions for
Lipschitz continuity of the optimal boundary.
Proposition 4.3. Let Assumptions 1–3 and Assumptions 6–8 hold. If either of the two
conditions below holds:
(i) there exist α, γ > 0 such that
|∂yyf | ≥ α > 0 and |∂xyf | ≤ γ(1 + |∂yyf |) on Σ;
(ii) there exists γ > 0 such that |∂xyf | ≤ γ|∂yyf | on Σ;
then Assumption 5 holds.
The proof of the proposition uses the next lemma concerning the optimal stopping
time defined in (3.24), whose slightly technical proof we move to the appendix.
Lemma 4.4. The mapping (t, x, y) 7→ τ∗(t, x, y) is P-almost surely continuous on
[0, T ]× Σ with τ∗(t, x, y) = 0, P-a.s. for (t, x, y) ∈ ∂C.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The idea of the proof combines ideas from De Angelis and
Stabile (2019) and De Angelis and Peskir (2020). First, for δ > 0 we define
cδ(t, x) := inf{y ∈ [0, 1] : u(t, x, y) < c0 − δ}
with inf ∅ = 1. Then it is clear that cδ( · ) > cδ′( · ) > c( · ) for all 0 < δ′ < δ by
monotonicity of y 7→ u(t, x, y). Since u is continuous then
lim
δ↓0
cδ(t, x) = c(t, x) (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
and if we can prove that x 7→ cδ(t, x) is Lipschitz with a constant independent of δ we
can conclude. By continuity of u we know that
u
(
t, x, cδ(t, x)
)
= c0 − δ
so that by the implicit function theorem, whose use is justified in step 2 below, we have
∂xcδ(t, x) = −
∂xu
(
t, x, cδ(t, x)
)
∂yu
(
t, x, cδ(t, x)
) , (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.(4.14)
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Thanks to Corollary 3.9 we have ∂xcδ(t, x) ≥ 0. In step 2 below we will find an upper
bound so that |∂xcδ| ≤ θc on [0, T ] × R, for a suitable constant θc > 0. This concludes
the proof.
Step 1: (Gradient estimates). We fix an arbitrary (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ and let
τ∗ = τ∗(t, x, y). Then for any ε > 0 we have
u(t, x, y + ε)− u(t, x, y)
≤ E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y + ε)− ∂yf(X∗; t,xt+s , y)
)
ds
]
=
∫ ε
0
E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂yyf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y + z)ds
]
dz,
where we used Fubini’s theorem in the final equality. Dividing by ε, letting ε→ 0 and
using the integrability condition from Assumption 8 we conclude
lim sup
ε→0
u(t, x, y + ε)− u(t, x, y)
ε
≤ E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂yyf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y)ds
]
.
Taking τ ε∗ := τ∗(t, x, y + ε) in the first expression above we have
u(t, x, y + ε)− u(t, x, y)
≥ E
[∫ τε∗
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y + ε)− ∂yf(X∗; t,xt+s , y)
)
ds
]
=
∫ ε
0
E
[∫ τε∗
0
e−rs∂yyf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y + z)ds
]
dz.
Dividing again by ε > 0 and letting ε → 0, we can now invoke Lemma 4.4 to justify
that τ ε∗ → τ∗ and obtain
lim inf
ε→0
u(t, x, y + ε)− u(t, x, y)
ε
≥ E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂yyf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y)ds
]
.
So, in conclusion we have shown that ∂yu exists in [0, T ]× Σ and it reads
∂yu(t, x, y) = E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂yyf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y)ds
]
.
Further, in light of the fact that (t, x, y) 7→ τ∗(t, x, y) and (t, x, y) 7→ (X∗; t,xt+s , y) are
P-a.s. continuous, we deduce that ∂yu is also continuous on [0, T ] × Σ, by dominated
convergence and Assumption 8. Finally, since ∂yyf < 0 (Assumption 2-(ii)), we have
that
∂yu
(
t, x, cδ(t, x)
)
< 0, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ,(4.15)
because
(
t, x, cδ(t, x)
) ∈ C and τ∗ > 0 at those points.
Next we obtain a similar result for ∂xu. With the same notation as above we have
u(t, x+ ε, y)− u(t, x, y)
≤ E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs
(
∂yf(X
∗; t,x+ε
t+s , y)− ∂yf(X∗; t,xt+s , y)
)
ds
]
=
∫ x+ε
x
E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂xyf(X
∗; t,η
t+s , y)Z
t,η
t+sds
]
dη.
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Dividing by ε and letting ε → 0, we use dominated convergence (Assumption 8) and
continuity of the flows x 7→ (X∗; t,x, Zt,x) to conclude
lim sup
ε→0
u(t, x+ ε, y)− u(t, x, y)
ε
≤ E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂xyf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y)Z
t,x
t+sds
]
.
By a symmetric argument and continuity of the optimal stopping time we also obtain
the reverse inequality and therefore conclude
∂xu(t, x, y) = E
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂xyf(X
∗; t,x
t+s , y)Z
t,x
t+sds
]
.
Also in this case continuity of (t, x, y) 7→ τ∗(t, x, y), due to Lemma 4.4, and (t, x) 7→(
X∗; t,x, Zt,x
)
, combined with dominated convergence, imply that ∂xu is continuous on
[0, T ]× Σ.
Step 2: (Bound on ∂xcδ). Since ∂yu and ∂xu are continuous and (4.15) holds, the
equation in (4.14) is fully justified as an application of the implicit function theorem.
In this step we use the probabilistic representations of ∂xu and ∂yu to obtain an upper
bound on ∂xcδ. First we recall the change of measure induced by Z (see (4.13)) and we
use it to write
∂xu(t, x, y) = E
Q
t,x
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs+
∫ s
0 a(X
∗
t+u,m
∗(t+u))du∂xyf(X
∗
t+s, y)ds
]
.
We want to find an upper bound for ∂xu in terms of the process under the original
measure P. Under the measure Q we have, by Girsanov theorem, that X∗ evolves
according to
dX∗t+s =
[
a(X∗t+s,m
∗(t+ s)) + σ(X∗t+s)∂xσ(X
∗
t+s)
]
ds+ σ(X∗t+s)dW
Q
t+s,
whereWQt+s =Wt+s−
∫ s
0 ∂xσ(X
∗
t+u)du defines a Brownian motion under Q. Analogously,
under the original measure P we can define a process X¯ with the same dynamics, i.e.,
dX¯t+s =
[
a(X¯t+s,m
∗(t+ s)) + σ(X¯t+s)∂xσ(X¯t+s)
]
ds+ σ(X¯t+s)dWt+s,
and denote
τ¯∗ := inf{s ∈ [0, T − t] : c(t+ s, X¯t+s) ≥ y}.
Then we have that the processes and stopping times are equal in law, i.e.
LawQ
(
X∗, τ∗
)
= LawP
(
X¯, τ¯∗
)
and we can express ∂xu in terms of the original measure as
∂xu(t, x, y) = Et,x
[∫ τ¯∗
0
e−rs+
∫ s
0 a(X¯t+u,m
∗(t+u))du∂xyf(X¯t+s, y)ds
]
.(4.16)
Let us first consider x 7→ σ(x) not constant. By comparison principles we have X¯ ≥
X∗ since ∂xσ ≥ 0 (Assumption 6), therefore ∂xyf(X¯, y) ≤ ∂xyf(X∗, y) by Assumption
8. Since x 7→ c(t, x) is non-decreasing as pointwise limit of non-decreasing functions
(recall Proposition 3.3), then c(t + s, X¯t+s) ≥ c(t + s,X∗t+s), hence implying τ¯∗ ≤ τ∗,
P-a.s. Recalling that ∂xyf > 0 from Assumption 2 and combining these few facts we
have
∂xu(t, x, y) ≤ ea¯(T−t)Et,x
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs∂xyf(X
∗
t+s, y)ds
]
,
where we also used ∂xa ≤ a¯ (Assumption 6). If instead σ(x) = σ is constant then
X∗ = X¯ by uniqueness of the SDE and therefore the above estimate follows directly
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from (4.16). Plugging this bound in (4.14) and recalling that ∂yyf < 0 we obtain
0 ≤ ∂xcδ(t, x) ≤ ea¯(T−t)
Et,x
[∫ τ∗
0 e
−rs∂xyf
(
X∗t+s, cδ(t, x)
)
ds
]
Et,x
[∫ τ∗
0 e
−rs
∣∣∂yyf(X∗t+s, cδ(t, x))∣∣ds] .
Now, if condition (i) holds we obtain
0 ≤ ∂xcδ(t, x) ≤ ea¯(T−t)
(γ
α
+ γ
)
, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and any δ > 0,
whereas if condition (ii) holds we obtain
0 ≤ ∂xcδ(t, x) ≤ ea¯(T−t)γ, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and any δ > 0.
So in the first case Assumption 5 holds with
θc = e
a¯T
(γ
α
+ γ
)
,
and in the second case with θc = γ exp(a¯T ). 
Next we provide a couple of examples meeting the requirements of Proposition 4.3.
Example 4.5 (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics with exponential-Cobb-Douglas profit).
Let a(x,m) := α(m − x) for some α > 0 and σ(x) ≡ σ for some σ > 0. Given a Borel
function m : [0, T ]→ [0, 1] the dynamics of X from (2.1) reads
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
α(m(s)−Xs)ds+ σWt, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let f(x, y) := exyβ for some β ∈ (0, 1) and for all (x, y) ∈ Σ. Finally assume that
E[exp(qX0)] <∞ for some q ≥ 1.
We check the assumptions of Proposition 4.3. Assumptions 1 and Assumption 6 on
the dynamics’ coefficients are trivially satisfied. The profit function f has the mono-
tonicity required by Assumption 2-(i) and it is strictly concave (Assumption 2-(ii)).
Also, ∂xyf(x, y) = βe
xyβ−1 > 0 (Assumption 2-(iii)) and (2.6) is satisfied since
lim
x→−∞
βex
y1−β
= 0 < rc0 < lim
x→∞
βex
y1−β
= +∞
for any y ∈ (0, 1) fixed. The integrability Assumption 3 is satisfied by the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck dynamics with initial condition as above. Assumption 7 is another integra-
bility assumption that reduces to finiteness of the second moment of the exponential
martingale Z (which is satisfied by boundedness of ∂xa and ∂xσ). Assumption 8 holds
because σ is constant. Finally Assumption (ii) in Proposition 4.3 is satisfied with any
γ ≥ 11−β since
|∂xyf(x, y)| = βe
x
y1−β
and |∂yyf(x, y)| = β(1− β)e
x
y2−β
.
We also notice that Assumption 4 holds so that Theorem 4.2 can be applied.
Example 4.6 (GBM dynamics with linear-Cobb-Douglas profit). Let a(x,m) := αmx
for some α > 0 and σ(x) := σx for some σ > 0. Given a Borel function m : [0, T ] →
[0, 1], the dynamics of X from (2.1) reads
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
αXsm(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σXsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ].
Non-negativity of the trajectories reduces the state space Σ to [0,∞)× [0, 1] (see Remark
2.3). Let f(x, y) := (1 + x)(1 + y)β for some β ∈ (0, 1) and for all (x, y) ∈ Σ. Finally
assume that ν ∈ P2(Σ) and that rc0 > β.
MEAN-FIELD GAMES OF SINGULAR CONTROL WITH FINITE FUEL 33
Let us check the assumptions of Proposition 4.3. Assumptions 1 and Assumption
6 on the dynamics’ coefficients are trivially satisfied. The profit function f has the
monotonicity required by Assumption 2-(i) and is strictly concave (Assumption 2-(ii)).
Also, ∂xyf(x, y) = β(1 + y)
β−1 > 0 (Assumption 2-(iii)) and Eq.(2.6) is satisfied since
lim
x→0
β(1 + x)
(1 + y)1−β
=
β
(1 + y)1−β
< β < rc0 < lim
x→∞
β(1 + x)
(1 + y)1−β
= +∞
for any y ∈ (0, 1) fixed. The integrability Assumption 3 is satisfied with p = 2 (or
higher provided the initial condition has finite p-th moment) thanks to sub-linearity of
the logarithm and standard estimates on the GBM dynamics. Assumption 7 is another
integrability assumption that reduces to finiteness of the second moment of the exponen-
tial martingale Z (which is satisfied by boundedness of ∂xa and ∂xσ). Assumption 8
holds because x 7→ ∂xyf(x, y) is decreasing. Finally Assumption (ii) in Proposition 4.3
is satisfied with any γ ≥ 21−β since
|∂xyf(x, y)| = β
(1 + y)1−β
and |∂yyf(x, y)| = β(1− β)(1 + x)
(1 + y)2−β
.
We also notice that Assumption 4 holds so that Theorem 4.2 can be applied.
We would like to emphasise that the conditions of Proposition 4.3 are far from being
necessary. While it would be overly complicated to state a general theorem in this sense,
we provide below an example with a clear economic interpretation for which Proposition
4.3 is not directly applicable.
4.4. A model with Geometric Brownian motion. Let us assume that a(x,m) =
(µ + m)x and σ(x) = σ x for some µ ∈ R and σ ∈ R+. Let us also assume that
f(x, y) = xg(y) with g ∈ C2([0, 1]), g > 0, strictly concave and strictly increasing. This
specification corresponds to the classical model of the goodwill problem in which firms
produce a good whose price evolves as a geometric Brownian motion and revenues are
linear in the price of the good and increasing and concave in the amount of investment
that goes towards advertising.
On the one hand, Assumptions 1–3 are easily verified and Theorem 2.4 holds (i.e., our
construction of the solution to the MFG holds). On the other hand, neither (i) or (ii) in
Proposition 4.3 hold, so we cannot apply directly the result on Lipschitz continuity of
the boundary which is needed for the approximation result in Theorem 4.2. However,
we shall now see how an alternative argument of proof can be applied to prove that
Assumption 5 remains valid.
First of all we change our coordinates by letting ψ := lnx, so that the value function
of the optimal stopping problem can be written as
u˜(t, ψ, y) := u(t, eψ, y) = inf
τ∈Tt
Et,ψ
[∫ τ
0
e−rsg′(y)eΨt+sds+ e−rτc0
]
,
where Ψt+s := lnX
∗
t+s is just a Brownian motion with drift, i.e.,
Ψt,ψt+s = ψ +
∫ s
0
(
µ− σ2/2 +m∗(t+ s))ds+ σd(Wt+s −Wt).
The optimal boundary can also be expressed in terms of (t, ψ) by putting c˜(t, ψ) =
c(t, eψ). Then the mean-field optimal control reads
ξ∗t = sup
0≤s≤t
(
c˜(s,Ψs)− y
)+
, t ∈ [0, T ]
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whereas the optimal stopping time for the value u˜(t, ψ, y) reads
τ∗ = inf{s ∈ [0, T − t] : c˜ (t+ s,Ψt+s) ≥ y}.
Now we show that the optimal boundary c˜( · ) is indeed Lipschitz with respect to ψ and
therefore the proof of Theorem 4.2 can be repeated with Ψ instead of X∗ so that the
theorem holds as stated. Since ∂ψΨ
t,ψ
t+s ≡ 1 for s ∈ [0, T − t] and Assumption 8 holds,
we can use the same arguments as in step 1 of the proof of Proposition 4.3 to obtain
∂yu˜(t, ψ, y) = g
′′(y)Et,ψ
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs+Ψt+sds
]
and
∂ψu˜(t, ψ, y) = g
′(y)Et,ψ
[∫ τ∗
0
e−rs+Ψt+sds
]
.
Then, by the same arguments as in step 2 of the proof of Proposition 4.3 we obtain
∂ψ c˜δ(t, ψ) = −
∂xw˜
(
t, ψ, c˜δ(t, ψ)
)
∂yw˜
(
t, ψ, c˜δ(t, ψ)
) = g′(c˜δ(t, ψ))|g′′(c˜δ(t, ψ))| ≤ κ,
for some κ > 0, where the final inequality holds because g ∈ C2([0, 1]) and strictly
concave. Therefore for the optimal boundary we have
sup
0≤t≤T
|c˜(t, ψ1)− c˜(t, ψ2)| ≤ κ|ψ1 − ψ2|, ψ1, ψ2 ∈ R,
as needed. In conclusion, the result of Theorem 4.2 remains valid, even though the opti-
mal boundary in the original parametrisation of the problem is not uniformly Lipschitz.
5. Appendix
In this appendix we collect a number of technical results used in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Fix (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ. Take any admissible control
ζ ∈ Ξt,x(y) and define, for q ≥ 0, its right-continuous inverse (see, e.g., (Revuz and
Yor, 2013, Ch. 0, Sec. 4)) τ ζ(q) := inf{s ∈ [t, T ) : ζs−t > q} ∧ T . The process
τ ζ := (τ ζ(q))q≥0 has increasing right-continuous sample paths, hence it admits left
limits τ ζ−(q) := inf {s ∈ [t, T ) : ζs−t ≥ q} ∧ T , for q ≥ 0. It can be shown that both
τ ζ(q) and τ ζ−(q) are (Ft+s)-stopping times for any q ≥ 0.
Let now q = z − y for z ≥ y and consider the function w defined as
w(t, x, y) := Φn(t, x)−
∫ 1
y
un(t, x, z) dz.
Since τ ζ(z − y) is admissible for un(t, x, z) we have
w(t, x, y) − Φn(t, x) ≥ −
∫ 1
y
Et,x
[
c0e
−rτζ(z−y) +
∫ τζ(z−y)
t
e−rs∂yf(X
[n]
s , z)ds
]
dz.
In order to compute the integral with respect to dz we observe that for t ≤ s < T we
have
{ζs−t < z − y} ⊆ {s < τ ζ(z − y)} ⊆ {ζs−t ≤ z − y}
by right-continuity and monotonicity of the process s 7→ ζs−t. The left-most and right-
most events above are the same up to dz-null sets. Then, applying Fubini’s theorem
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more than once we obtain
w(t, x, y) −Φn(t, x)
≥ Et,x
[
−
∫ 1
y
e−rτ
ζ(z−y)c0 dz −
∫ T
t
e−rs
∫ 1
y
∂yf(X
[n]
s , z)1{s<τζ (z−y)} dz ds
]
= Et,x
[
−
∫ 1
y
e−rτ
ζ(z−y)c0 dz −
∫ T
t
e−rs
∫ 1
y
∂yf(X
[n]
s , z)1{ζs−t<z−y}dz ds
]
= Et,x
[
−
∫ 1
y
e−rτ
ζ(z−y)c0 dz −
∫ T
t
e−rs[f(X [n]s , 1) − f(X [n]s , y + ζs−t)] ds
]
= Jn(t, x, y; ζ)− Φn(t, x),
where the final equality uses the well-known change of variable formula (see, e.g., Revuz
and Yor, 2013, Ch. 0, Proposition 4.9)∫ 1
y
e−rτ
ζ(z−y)dz =
∫
[t,T ]
e−rsdζs−t.
By the arbitrariness of ζ ∈ Ξt,x(y) we conclude wn(t, x, y) ≥ vn(t, x, y).
For the reverse inequality we take ζs = ξ
[n]∗
t+s as defined in Lemma 3.4. Recall that
τ
[n]
∗ (t, x, z) = inf
{
s ∈ [0, T − T ] : z ≤ cn(t+ s,X [n]; t,xt+s )
}
.
and since s 7→ cn(s,X [n]; t,xs ) − z is upper semi-continuous, it attains a maximum over
any compact interval in [t, T ). In particular, for s ∈ [t, T )
τ
[n]
∗ (t, x, z) ≤ s ⇐⇒ there exists θ ∈ [t, t+ s] such that cn(θ,X [n]; t,xθ ) ≥ z.
For any y < z, the latter is also equivalent to
ξ
[n]∗
t+s = sup
0≤u≤s
(
cn(t+ u,X
[n]; t,x
t+u )− y
)+
≥ z − y
and, therefore, it is also equivalent to τ ξ
[n]∗
− (z − y) ≤ s. Since s ∈ [t, T ] was arbitrary
the chain of equivalences implies that τ ξ
[n]∗
− (z − y) = τ [n]∗ (t, x, z), P-a.s. for any z > y.
However, we have already observed that for a.e. z > y it must be τ ξ
[n]∗
− (z − y) =
τ ξ
[n]∗
(z − y), P-a.s., hence τ ξ[n]∗(z − y) = τ [n]∗ (t, x, z) as well. The latter, in particular
implies
w(t, x, y) − Φn(t, x) = −
∫ 1
y
Et,x
[
c0e
−rτξ
[n]∗
(z−y) +
∫ τξ[n]∗ (z−y)
t
e−rs∂yf(X
[n]
s , z)ds
]
dz,
by optimality of τ
[n]
∗ (t, x, z) in un(t, x, z). Repeating the same steps as above we then
find
w(t, x, y) = Jn(t, x, y; ξ
[n]∗),
which combined with vn ≤ w concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3.10. We have C[n] ⊂ C[n+1] ⊂ C because the sequence (cn)n≥0
is decreasing. Then, the sequence (τ
[n]
∗ )n≥0 is increasing and limn→∞ τ
[n]
∗ ≤ τ∗, Pt,x,y-
a.s. for any (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ. In order to prove the reverse inequality, first we
observe that t 7→ X [k]t (ω) is continuous for all ω ∈ Ω \ Nk with P(Nk) = 0, for all
k ≥ 0. Moreover, t 7→ Xt(ω) is continuous for all ω ∈ Ω \ N with P(N) = 0. Let us
set N0 := (∪kNk) ∪ N and Ω0 := Ω \ N0 so that P(Ω0) = 1. Fix (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ
and ω ∈ Ω0. Let δ > 0 be such that τ∗(ω) > δ (if no such δ exists, then τ∗(ω) = 0 and
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τ
[n]
∗ (ω) ≥ τ∗(ω) for all n ≥ 0). Then, since s 7→ u(t+ s, X˜t+s(ω), y) is continuous, there
must exist ε > 0 such that
sup
0≤s≤δ
(
u(t+ s, X˜t+s(ω), y)− c0
)
≤ −ε.(5.1)
At the same time we also notice that s 7→ un(t + s,X [n]t+s(ω), y) is continuous and
moreover
un(t+ s,X
[n]
t+s(ω), y) ≥ un+1(t+ s,X [n]t+s(ω), y) ≥ un+1(t+ s,X [n+1]t+s (ω), y)
by monotonicity of the sequences (un)n≥0 and (X
[n])n≥0 and of the map x 7→ un(t, x, y).
So we have that un(t+ ·,X [n]· (ω), y) is a decreasing sequence of continuous functions of
time and since the limit is also continuous, the convergence is uniform on [0, δ]. Then,
there exists n0 ≥ 0 sufficiently large that
sup
0≤s≤δ
∣∣∣u(t+ s, X˜t+s(ω), y)− un(t+ s,X [n]t+s(ω), y)∣∣∣ ≤ −ε2 , for n ≥ n0.
Using this fact and (5.1) we have
sup
0≤s≤δ
(
un(t+ s,X
[n]
t+s(ω), y)− c0
)
≤ −ε
2
and τ
[n]
∗ (ω) > δ, for all n ≥ n0. Since δ > 0 was arbitrary, we obtain
lim
n→∞
τ
[n]
∗ (ω) ≥ τ∗(ω).
Recalling that ω ∈ Ω0 was also arbitrary we obtain the desired result. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. The proof is divided in two steps: first we show that (t, x, y) 7→
τ∗(t, x, y) is lower semi-continuous and then that it is upper semi-continuous. Both
parts of the proof rely on continuity of the flow (t, x, s) 7→ X∗; t,xt+s (ω). The latter holds
for all ω ∈ Ω \N where N is a universal set with P(N) = 0. For simplicity, in the rest
of the proof we just write X instead of X∗.
Step 1. (Lower semi-continuity). This part of the proof is similar to that of Lemma
3.10. Fix (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ and take a sequence (tn, xn, yn)n≥1 that converges to
(t, x, y) as n → ∞. Denote τ∗ = τ∗(t, x, y) and τn := τ∗(tn, xn, yn) and fix an arbitrary
ω ∈ Ω \ N . If (t, x, y) ∈ S then τ∗(ω) = 0 and lim infn τn(ω) ≥ τ∗(ω) trivially. Let
δ > 0 be such that τ∗(ω) > δ. Then by continuity of the value function u and of the
trajectory s 7→ Xt,xt+s(ω) there must exist ε > 0 such that
sup
0≤s≤δ
(
u(t+ s,Xt,xt+s(ω), y)− c0
) ≤ −ε.
Thanks to continuity of the stochastic flow there is no loss of generality in assuming
that (tn + s,X
tn,xn
tn+s (ω), yn) lies in a compact K for all n ≥ 1 and s ≤ δ. Then there
must exits nε > 0 such that
sup
0≤s≤δ
∣∣u(t+ s,Xt,xt+s(ω), y)− u(tn + s,Xtn,xntn+s (ω), y)∣∣ ≤ ε/2
for all n ≥ nε (by uniform continuity). Combining the above we get
sup
n≥nε
sup
0≤s≤δ
(
u(tn + s,X
tn,xn
tn+s (ω), yn)− c0
) ≤ −ε/2,
which implies τn(ω) > δ for all n ≥ nε. Hence lim infn τn(ω) > δ and since δ and ω were
arbitrary we conclude lim infn τn(ω) > τ∗(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω \N .
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Step 2. (Upper semi-continuity). For this part of the proof we need to introduce
the hitting time σ◦∗ to the interior of the stopping set S◦ := int(S) (which is not empty
thanks to the argument of proof of Lemma 3.8), i.e.,
σ◦∗(t, x, y) := inf{s ∈ (0, T − t] : (t+ s,Xt,xt+s, y) ∈ S◦}.
Assume for a moment that
Pt,x,y(τ∗ = σ
◦
∗) = 1 for all (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Σ.(5.2)
Then we can invoke Lemma 4 in De Angelis and Peskir (2020) (see Eq. (3.7) therein)
to conclude that (t, x, y) 7→ σ◦∗(t, x, y) is upper semi-continuous. Hence, given (t, x, y) ∈
[0, T ] × Σ and any sequence (tn, xn, yn)n≥1 converging to (t, x, y) as n → ∞, setting
τn = τ∗(tn, xn, yn) and σ
◦
n = σ
◦
∗(tn, xn, yn), we have τn(ω) = σ
◦
n(ω) for all ω ∈ Ωn with
P(Ωn) = 1 for each n ≥ 1; therefore letting Ω¯ := ∩n≥1Ωn we have P(Ω¯) = 1 and
lim sup
n→∞
τn(ω) = lim sup
n→∞
σ◦n(ω) ≤ σ◦∗(ω) = τ∗(ω),
with τ∗ = τ∗(t, x, y) and σ
◦
∗ = σ
◦
∗(t, x, y), for all ω ∈ Ω¯ ∩ {τ∗ = σ◦∗} where P(Ω¯ ∩ {τ∗ =
σ◦∗}) = 1.
Let us now prove (5.2). We introduce the generalised left-continuous inverse of x 7→
c(t, x), i.e.
b(t, y) = sup{x ∈ R : c(t, x) < y}.
Then it is easy to check that t 7→ b(t, y) is non-increasing. This implies that Pt,x,y(τ∗ =
σ◦∗) = 1 for all (t, x, y) ∈ S◦ by continuity of the paths of X. Moreover, for (t, x, y) ∈ C
we have σ◦∗ = τ∗ + σ
◦
∗ ◦ θτ∗ , where {θt, t ≥ 0} is the shift operator, i.e., (t,Xt(ω)) ◦ θs =
(t+ s,Xt+s(ω)). Then, τ∗ = σ
◦
∗ if and only if σ
◦
∗ ◦ θτ∗ = 0. Since σ◦∗ ◦ θτ∗ is the hitting
time to S◦ after the process (t,X, y) has reached the boundary ∂C of the continuation
set, the previous condition is implied by Pt,x,y(σ
◦
∗ = 0) = 1 for (t, x, y) ∈ ∂C. So we now
focus on proving the latter.
We claim that
S◦ = {(t, x, y) : x > b(t, y)}
and will give a proof of this fact in Lemma 5.1 below. Then by the law of iterated
logarithm and non-increasing t 7→ b(t, y) we immediately obtain Pt,x,y(σ◦∗ = 0) = 1 for
(t, x, y) ∈ ∂C because (t, x, y) ∈ ∂C if and only if x ≥ b(t, y). 
Lemma 5.1. We have
S◦ = {(t, x, y) : x > b(t, y)}.(5.3)
Proof. While the claim may seem obvious, since y 7→ b(t, y) is non-decreasing, one
should notice that for it to hold we must rule out the case b(t, y) < b(t, y+) for all
(t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, 1). Indeed, if the latter occurs for some (t0, y0) we have {t0} ×
(b(t0, y0), b(t0, y0+))× {y0} ∈ ∂C and (5.3) fails.
Here we use an argument by contradiction inspired to De Angelis (2015). Assume
that there exists (t0, y0) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, 1] such that x01 := b(t0, y0) < b(t0, y0+) =: x02.
Then we proceed in two steps.
Step 1. (A PDE for the value function). Since (t, x) 7→ a(x,m∗(t)) is not continuous
in general we cannot immediately apply standard PDE arguments that guarantee that
∂tu+
σ2( · )
2
∂xxu+ a( ·,m∗( · ))∂xu− ru = −∂yf, for (t, x, y) ∈ C
(see Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006, Chapter III). However, given δ > 0 and letting Oδ :=
(t0− δ, t0)× (x01, x02) we have Oδ × (y0, y0+ δ) ⊂ C. Moreover, with no loss of generality
we can assume δ > 0 sufficiently small and such that m∗−(t) := limε↓0m
∗(t − ε) is
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continuous on (t0− δ, t0] (recall that m∗ is non-decreasing and right-continuous). Since
m∗ is non-decreasing it has at most countably many jumps on any compact and therefore
replacing m∗ with m∗− in the dynamics of X (3.20) (recall that m
∗ = m˜) we obtain a
new process X ′ which is indistinguishable from the original one. Then, starting from
(t, x, y) ∈ Oδ × (y0, y0 + δ) and letting τO be the first exit time of (t+ s,X ′t+s) from Oδ
we have that
s 7→ e−r(s∧τO)u(t+ s ∧ τO,X ′s∧τO , y) +
∫ s∧τO
0
e−ru∂yf(X
′
t+u, y)du
is a continuous martingale. By standard arguments (see Peskir and Shiryaev, 2006,
Chapter III) this translates to the fact that for each y ∈ (y0, y0 + δ) the value function
u( · , y) is the unique solution in C1,2(Oδ) ∩ C(Oδ) of the boundary value problem
∂tw +
σ2( · )
2
∂xxw + a( ·,m∗−( · ))∂xw − rw = −∂yf( · , y), on Oδ(5.4)
with w( · ) = u( · , y) at ∂POδ, where ∂POδ is the parabolic boundary of Oδ (notice that
now the claim is correct because (t, x) 7→ a(x,m∗−(t)) is continuous in Oδ).
Step 2. (Contradiction). Thanks to the result in step 1 we can now find a contra-
diction. Pick an arbitrary ϕ ∈ C∞c ((x01, x02)), ϕ ≥ 0 and multiply (5.4) by ϕ (with
w( · ) = u( · , y)). Since t 7→ u(t, x, y) is non-decreasing we have ∂tu( · , y) ≥ 0 on Oδ and
therefore, for each y ∈ (y0, y0 + δ) we have
ϕ( · )
[
σ2( · )
2
∂xxu( · , y) + a( · ,m∗−( · ))∂xu( · , y) − ru( · , y)
]
≤ −ϕ( · )∂yf( · , y), on Oδ.
In the inequality above we fix t0 and integrate over (x
0
1, x
0
2). By using integration-by-
parts formula we obtain1∫ x02
x01
(
1
2∂xx
[
σ2(x)ϕ(x)
] − ∂x[a(x,m(t0))ϕ(x)] − rϕ(x))u(t0, x, y)dx
≤ −
∫ x02
x01
∂yf(x, y)ϕ(x)dx.
Now, letting y ↓ y0, using dominated convergence and u(t0, x, y0) = c0 for x ∈ (x01, x02),
and undoing the integration by parts we obtain
(5.5)
∫ x02
x01
(∂yf(x, y0)− rc0)ϕ(x)dx ≤ 0.
Hence ∂yf(x, y0)− rc0 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ (x01, x01) by arbitrariness of ϕ ≥ 0 and continuity
of x 7→ ∂yf(x, y0)− rc0. However, since S ⊆ [0, T ]× (Σ \H) (recall (3.7)), then it must
be ∂yf(x, y0) − rc0 = 0 for all x ∈ (x01, x01), which contradicts ∂xyf > 0 (Assumption
2-(iii)). 
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